Between neoliberalism and difference:

Multiple practices of property in post-Soviet Russia

Marianna Pavlovskaya

Department of Geography, Hunter College –CUNY, PhD Program in Earth and Environmental Sciences, 695 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10065; voice 212-772-5320

mpavlov@hunter.cuny.edu

Forthcoming in Europe-Asia Studies.
Abstract

The aggressive neoliberalization of the last two decades in Russia failed to produce a uniform system of private property and profit-maximizing enterprises. Instead, the complex interactions of multiple “practices of property” that are pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet in origin, and not private property alone, have created a diverse economic landscape. Moreover, multiple practices of property have produced both capitalist economies (such as Moscow’s early capitalist enterprises) and non-capitalist, ethically guided economies (such as indigenous enterprises of Arctic reindeer herders). The persistence of alternative economic logics in Russia shows limits to the role of private property in shaping the post-Soviet economy.

Acknowledgements

The research for this article was supported by PSC-CUNY Research Award # 69702-00 29, George N. Shuster Faculty Fellowship of Hunter College, and SSRC Eurasia Teaching Fellowship (2006-2007). It was partially carried out while at Kvinnsforsk (Center for Gender Studies) at the University of Tromsø, Norway as a guest scholar in Spring 2010. Winifried Dallmann of Norwegian Polar Institute and Yulian Konstantinov of University of Tromsø have generously shared their insights into the situation of Sami and Nenets peoples in Russia. I would like to thank the editors of this special issue – Sonia Hirt, Christian Sellar, and Craig Young for their organizational and editorial work as well as two anonymous reviewers and Kevin St.Martin for their advice on how to improve the article.
1 Introduction

It is tempting to see contemporary Russia as a neoliberal space-economy governed by private property relations created during the last two decades (Klein 2008). This paper, however, argues that despite the concerted neoliberal policy effort to institute private property in order to build capitalism (Sachs 1992, 1995; Offe 1995; Aslund 2001; Klein 2008), post-Soviet space has become home to a heterogeneous economy shaped by multiple “practices of property.” By practices of property I mean a complex array of pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet traditions of property, both legal and informal in origin. The common characterization of the post-Soviet change as a move “from plan to market” (Word Bank 1996) masks this heterogeneity because it implies a complete transformation of property relations from one uniform kind to another. It works to entrench the neoliberal imaginary of Russian past and future that centers on private property and profit maximization while disregarding collective and ethical forms of the economy that already exist and may be emerging. In contrast to these homogenizing representations, my analysis reveals multiple practices of property at work in the post-Soviet space. I hope that understanding their open-ended synergy will help to imagine post-Soviet Russia as a site in which ethical economies based on justice and cooperation can also emerge.

Foregrounding multiple property practices and diverse economy may sound paradoxical given the apparent depth of the “systemic” move from “plan to market” implemented by the means of privatization and economic liberalization. Coincidental with the ascent of neoliberalism to global hegemony, the move pursued the most laissez-faire models of capitalism (Mitchell 2005; Harvey 2005a; World Bank 1996) as well as
the remaking of the “existential” proportions of the altruistic “builders of socialism” into the self-interested neoliberal entrepreneurs (Epstein 1995; Ashwin 1999; Oushakine 2001; Yurchak 2003; Dunn 2004; Swain 2006). Yet, in the last two decades, the research has documented the ways in which post-socialist actors such as households and enterprises have employed non-market and informal survival mechanisms (Rose 1994; Pickles and Smith 1996; Clarke 2000; Pavlovskaya and Hanson 2001; Pavlovskaya 2004; Smith and Stenning 2006; Round and Williams 2010; Smith et al. 2008; Stenning et al. 2010; Round and Williams 2010) indicating that there have been limits to as well as significant geographic variation in paths of neoliberalization (e.g., Stark 1996; Hann 1998a; Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Hann and The “Property relations” group 2003). Clearly, the effort to produce private property and forge neoliberal subjects has produced more than one way to perform the economy and more than a single economic subjectivity. Yet, the powerful discourse of neoliberalism directs the Russian policy and our imaginations of its post-Soviet society to private property, private enterprise, and capitalism. Both the policy intent and representation work to homogenize the post-Soviet property relations and economic practices.

This article draws on critical, feminist, and post-structuralist geographic theory to further challenge the narrative of the uniform neoliberal transformation in Russia. To do so, I examine the role of multiple post-Soviet practices of property that result, I hope to show, in the production of a heterogeneous economy. My approach does not see this heterogeneity as a temporary mechanism for surviving the consequences of the neoliberal “shock therapy” or a by-product of incomplete liberalization. Following J.-K. Gibson-Graham (1996, 2007), I begin with the premise that the economy is always irreducibly
diverse (c.f., Pavlovskaya 2004; Stenning and Smith 2006). In this article, I focus on how the multiple practices of property rather than neoliberal version of private property alone have taken hold in Russia and how they generate economic diversity instead of a presumably undifferentiated capitalist economy. I also draw on critical scholarship on law, property, and space (Blomley et al. 2001; Mitchell 2003; Blomley 2004; Benda-Beckmann, Benda-Beckmann, and Griffiths 2009b) to elicit the role of space in the constitution of economic heterogeneity through multiple practices of property.

Two case studies presented here interrogate the two assertions of the neoliberal discourse that, I argue, work to sustain the view of capitalism as a self-sufficient, self-propelling, and monolithic economy. The first is that private property is solely responsible for production of capitalism while other practices of property either interfere with or are irrelevant to it. The insights into urban privatization in Moscow in the 1990s show how capitalism emerged out of multiple practices of property rather than private ownership alone. Moreover, capitalism thrived precisely in the spaces governed by distinctly Soviet statist and clearly non-private practices of property. The second assertion of neoliberalism is that private property is always constitutive of capitalism. The case of Arctic reindeer herders in Northern Russia, however, demonstrates that privatization in combination with non-capitalist property practices has enabled the communal economies of the indigenous people in a variety of property forms. While the emphasis on private ownership, competition, and profit-maximization has weighed heavily in post-soviet ideology of “building capitalism” (Aslund 2001), each case study illustrates with clarity how the actions of place-specific economic actors work against the centrality of neoliberal narrative in the remaking of the Russian society. In Moscow,
capitalism was constituted through non-capitalist practices of property while in the 
Arctic, privatization in combination with other practices of property led to formation of 
communal indigenous economy. Therefore, multiple practices of property have played a 
crucial although unacknowledged role in production of capitalism (despite that credit for 
this goes to private property alone) and non-capitalism (the persistent role of which in 
Russian society remains unrecognized). I conclude that the socio-spatial synergy of 
multiple practices of property undermines capitalist uniformity in both urban Moscow 
and the Arctic tundra, the contexts as marked by their geographic differences as by their 
historical circumstances.

In terms of methodology, the article draws on two related research projects on 
Russian privatization. The case study of post-privatization Moscow uses data on urban 
establishments that I originally collected in the 1990s, including in-depth formal and 
informal interviews with Muscovites of different class backgrounds as well as secondary 
sources such as press and policy documents spanning two decades. The analysis of the 
indigenous economies is part of an on-going project. It draws on published scholarly 
work, reports, and policy documents as well as interviews with academics, legal experts, 
and indigenous rights advocates in Norway and Moscow conducted in 2010-2011.

The article is organized as follows. The next section outlines the scope and 
significance of privatization of “socialist property” in Russia. The following section lays 
out the theoretical approach for my analysis. An anti-essentialist critique of the neoliberal 
assumptions guiding privatization in Russia serves as an entry point into the analysis of 
multiple practices of property and helps to establish connections between these practices 
and space. In section four I examine the role of multiple property practices in the
production of capitalism in Moscow. Section five examines their role in the revival of indigenous economies of the reindeer herders in the Russian Northern territories. The conclusion discusses the significance of this approach for understanding modern capitalism, the production of economic difference, and emergence of possibility.

2 Privatizing socialist property

Privatization has been a central strategy of neoliberalism globally and in post-socialist countries (Pickles and Smith 1998; Boycko et al. 1997; Chang 2006) but its scope, extent, and impact in the former Soviet republics are unique. This is because, in contrast to most of the world, including other socialist countries in which some forms of private property have been legally allowed, private property simply did not exist in the former Soviet Union. The privatization of the 1990s in Russia, therefore, represents a formidable policy effort (Offe 1995; Aslund 2001) and no less an epic event than the abolishment of private property after the 1917 October revolution.

2.1 Soviet property relations

The property regime of the USSR engulfed one-sixth of the Earth’s land surface and determined lives of the third largest after only China and India population for most of the 20th century. Despite the abolishment of private property, the word for property - “sobstvennost’” in Russian - remained part of the legal vocabulary to designate the property types within the new “socialist property” (BSE 1978a) that provided collective ownership rights to all Soviet citizens. The “state property” included the means of production (such as land, natural resources, industrial enterprises, infrastructure, cultural
production, retail outlets) and collective consumption (such as housing, libraries, and museums). In the agriculture, however, collective farms owned their means of production as “cooperative property” (with the exception of land). Finally, property of the so-called “societal organizations” (e.g., the Communist Party, Komsomol, and trade-unions) included their buildings and infrastructure and infrastructure. Privatization of these assets, in addition to creation of new private enterprises has been the core of the post-Soviet neoliberal reform.

The Soviet people also owned “personal property” that they could buy, sell, and will to others but not could, in contrast to private property, use as a means of production but (BSE 1978b). It included personal consumption items (from clothes to cars), limited cooperative urban housing and garden cooperatives for urban residents. Rural residents, however, owned their private homes (but not land) often lacking modern conveniences and had in their use personal plots allocated to them by their farm for subsistence gardening (“lichnoye podsobnoye khozyaistvo”). The fact that a significant portion of the Soviet population earned cash income in the informal economy arguably points to the presence of entrepreneurial logics (Treml 1994; Grossman 1989). But the ability to generate wealth by privately owning an enterprise or real estate and employing workers was beyond the imagination of the average Soviet citizen. Thus, the shift to a private property regime has been indeed a paramount change.

2.2 Neoliberal privatization

Cooperative ownership of small enterprises in manufacturing and services, a big entrepreneurial innovation of Gorbachev’s perestroika, became legal within the context
of the Soviet property relations described above. The new Russian government of Boris Yeltsin, however, precipitated the instantaneous demise of “socialist property” in 1991 and began its immediate transfer to private ownership. With Soviet legal systems no longer in place, all property relations had to be redefined. Already in 1991, private ownership of land was created (Levakova 2006) and mass voucher privatization of small state enterprises took place, soon followed by privatization of large enterprises according to “loans for shares” schemes (Boycko et al. 2007; Chang 2006). The right to private property has been legally affirmed in numerous documents including the 1993 Constitution of Russia, the 1994 Civil Code, the 2001 Land Code and subsequent decrees and regulations (Wegren 2003, p.2). Two decades later, 80% of agricultural land (Levakova 2006) and 85% of enterprises providing over 58% of Russian employment were in private ownership (Russia in figures in 2010).

To a large degree, these transition policies were framed by neoliberal ideology that promotes a particularly laissez-faire version of capitalism. Neoliberalism was articulated most fully by Milton Friedman and Frederic Hayek (Harvey 2005a; Klein 2008), later to be spread globally by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). IMF economists such as Jeffry Sachs advocated for the neoliberal slant of Russian transition policies that made sure that the initially discussed models of European welfare states or “third way” development received little consideration in the end (Sachs 1995; Sher and Baxandall 2000 for Joseph Stiglitz’s 1999 speech to the World Bank; Hoffman 2003).

The internal contradictions and devastating economic and political effects of neoliberalism have been fruitfully addressed in many contexts (Harvey 2005a; Klein 2008; Hackworth 2006; Pickles and Smith 1998; also this issue). Below I will focus on
those aspects of the neoliberal notions of property that, in my view, have led to the
discursive homogenization of the post-Soviet economy.

The case for neoliberalism was bolstered by the debates surrounding the Soviet
“shortage economy” and circumcised democracy under the Soviet system. Neoliberalism
emphasizes the superior productivity of laisser-faire capitalism and its ethical worth as a
guarantor of freedom making it the only viable alternative to Soviet failures (Kornai
1992; Sachs 1995). Jeffry Sachs described the choice between the neoliberalism and
Soviet system as a choice between “creative destruction” and “non-creative preservation”
(Sachs 1995, p. 30) when the “despicable and inefficient” communist system has to give
way to a “new and vibrant” private sector (Sachs 1992, p. 43). The implication is that, in
contrast to other economies, capitalism is uniquely viable on its own because of its
universal and natural economic rationality. This rationality is best realized within the
institutions governed by private property. Jeffry Sachs argued that most problems of
transitional period “can be ameliorated by rapid privatization” (Sachs 1992, p. 44)
because “clear motivation of wealth-maximization comes with private ownership” (Sachs
1992, p. 43). Thus, only private property generates profit-maximizing behavior and
privatization necessarily results in capitalism.

Neoliberalism posits unrestrained capitalism as morally superior as well. As
Milton Friedman argued in his seminal work “Capitalism and freedom” (1982, originally
published in 1962) private property is the only guarantor of political freedom which is
increasingly threatened by the state (see also Sachs 1995; Boycko et al. 1997; Hoffman
2003; Chang 2006). In addition, Sachs explains, the ethical worth of capitalism comes
from that it rewards those who engage in profitable, and, therefore, useful economies
governed by fair competition. “Transparent and fair privatization methods” ensure equal opportunities for everyone (Sachs 1992, p.44). The assertion that ethically justified superior productivity can be achieved only within private property implies that other practices of property lack comparable worth and importance.

Finally, neoliberal orthodoxy maintains a particularly strong dichotomy between the state and the private sector making the economy appear as a shifting battlefield between the two. In this sense, not only the Soviet socialist state but even the Russian neoliberal state remains the prime suspect because it can always “cripple the press for privatization” as some of its parts are “more interested in enhancing their political authority than in developing a market-based economy” (Sachs 1992, 46). Simultaneously, the neoliberal theorists populate the private sector only by profit-maximizing enterprises as the sole actors within capitalist societies. They do not include other types of property and enterprises (such as cooperatives, non-profits, NGOs, social enterprises, public and common access property) among worthy components of the economy (Sachs 1995).

In short, the goal of the Russian neoliberal reform has been the creation of the independent from the state profit-seeking enterprises by rapid privatization of the “socialist property.” The neoliberal narrative asserts that private property is the only instrument for creation of capitalism and presumes that privatization results in capitalist economy. It excludes the possibility that other actors can partake in the production of capitalism or non-capitalist actors can emerge during privatization. In other words, neoliberal discourse helps to maintain the status of private property and profit-maximizing enterprise as the only legitimate and existing outcome of the post-Soviet
reform that continue to command the available legal, financial, and logistical support (Bukreev and Rudyk 2006).

3 From single to multiple practices of property

3.1 Economy as heterogeneous

While in the neoliberal framework private property and profit seeking are a foundation of prosperity, in Marxism and other critical discourses of capitalism they are seen as a source of exploitation. What has been a “magnificent privatization” for neoliberal observers (Chang 2006), is “accumulation by dispossession” for the critics (Harvey 2005b), and in Russia is unmatched in scope, pace, and spatial extent. Despite their differences, both neoliberal and critical discourses tend to extend the social relations of private property and the capitalist enterprise to society as a whole. They lead us to assume the society is constituted solely by capitalist property and economy.

In view of J.-K. Gibson-Graham, both capitalist and Marxian discourses are “capitalocentric” because of their overwhelming focus on capitalism at the expense of other economic practices. Centering on capitalism, they argue, enhances its hegemony in economic imagination and forecloses the recognition of the possible and often already existing alternatives. For J.-K. Gibson-Graham and other post-structuralist Marxist theorists, overcoming this hegemony involves theorizing economic diversity as already present. To do so, they use a less expansive definition of capitalism that, instead of the entirety of society, refers only to a class process in which waged workers’ surplus is appropriated by those who own the means of production (Resnick and Wolff 1987;
Western capitalism can now include other class processes in addition to the waged relation such as, for example, unpaid domestic work or a cash-based informal economy. In addition, certain formal enterprises (such as coops, ethically driven private firms, and non-profit organizations) can be analytically separated from a hegemonic capitalist enterprise. Within this framework, capitalism becomes just one of the many post-socialist economies (c.f. Pavlovskaya 2004; Stenning and Smith 2006). Extending this logic to property relations enables me to foreground multiple forms of property as a consequence of the transformation of property relations in Russia.

3.2 Multiple practices of property and their spatiality

In this regard, it is useful to understand emerging property relations as practices of property. While the concept of practice has many meanings in the social sciences (Bourdieu 1996; Foucault 1979; Schatzki et al. 2001; Blomley 2004; Latour 2007; Thrift 2007), I use it here to communicate the need to see property relations as an open-ended and contradictory social process as opposed to a defined legal framework. Contemporary social theory has shown that seemingly dispassionate property laws are deeply permeated by power (Foucault 1979; Callon 1998; Mitchell 2005). That is, legal definitions of property matter but so do their daily enactment and performance by people and institutions. As a major technology of exclusion, private property remains “unsettled” even in the very hearths of capitalism (Blomley 2004) where it requires armies of lawyers, police, and social scientists to maintain its legitimacy and perpetually valorize and enforce it (Mitchell 2005; Mansfield 2004). Other cultural notions of property, even when undefined in legal terms or made explicitly illegal, also shape the economy in
important ways. These multiple, formal and informal, practices of property always interact with and contest each other necessitating the analysis of their synergetic impact. Finally, property relations are always embedded in space (Blomley et al. 2001; Mitchell 2003; Blomley 2004; Smith 2004; Atkinson and Bridge 2005; St. Martin 2007; Lees et al. 2008; Mansfield 2008) making the analysis of spaces in which the interaction occurs crucially important for understanding how the economic diversity is produced.

3.3 Post-Soviet practices of property

Despite its seemingly clear and instrumental nature, privatization has been a highly uncertain process in many post-socialist countries (Stark 1996; Hann 1998a,b; Verdery 2003; Verdery and Humphrey 2004; Woodruff 2004; also see contributions by Flemming and Lidner in this issue). In Russia, it is bound to be even more contested, because, among other factors, private property has particularly short and disrupted history (Levakova 2006; Limonov 2009) while communal economic traditions, both pre-Soviet and Soviet in origin, persist (Ashwin 1999; Bloch 2005; Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2006b; Rogers 2006). Russian actors, therefore, interpret private property in light of their experience with other practices of property (e.g., informal and non-monetized economic transactions, barter, subsistence farming, mutual help, collective enterprises, etc.) that, despite being treated in the neoliberal writings as temporary and annoying “soviet legacies” (Aslund 2001; Gaddy and Ickes 1998; Lynch 2002; Hill and Gaddy 2003), continue to provide livelihoods for households and enterprises (Ickes and Ryterman 1994; Hann 1998b; Ledeneva 1998; Pickles 1998, 2002; Pickles and Smith 1998; Woodruff 1999; Rainnie et al. 2002; Clarke 2000, 2002; Verdery 2003; Alexander 2004;
The continued interaction of multiple practices of property, therefore, makes privatization in Russia a much more open-ended process than the shift from “plan” to “market” implies. The subsequent sections challenge the neoliberal narratives of privatization as a source of and strategy for homogenization of space into capitalist economy. The case study of privatization in Moscow demonstrates that presumably anti-state capitalist enterprises had origins in more than just one practice of private property. As the case study of indigenous economies shows, privatization, in turn, has produced more than one intended (capitalist) economy. Together, they create an opening for “decentering” post-soviet capitalism and theorizing the emergence of diverse economies.

4 Making room for capitalism in urban Moscow

The urban landscape of former Soviet cities was drastically remade in the last two decades by privatization (Gritsai 1997; Pavlovskaya and Hanson 2001), changes in governance and politics (Dixon 2010; Golubchikov 2010), globalization (Gritsai 2004; Kolossov and O’Loughlin 2004), gentrification (Gdaniec 1997; Badyina and Golubchikov 2005), and the transformation of class and gender relations (Vendina 2002; Pavlovskaya 2004; Hirt 2008). At the same time, representatives of the Soviet nomenklatura (the elite group of Communist Party and Komsomol executives) have often become members of the new capitalist class (e.g., Kryshtanovskaya 1995; Kryshtanovskaya and White 2002). The specific political economic mechanisms, however, by which Communist and Komsomol leaders as well as many “self-made” oligarchs, virtually overnight, turned
themselves into prospering capitalists remain unexplained. In particular, it remains unclear how spaces of capitalist production were so quickly established through privatization.

Figure 1 around here

Moscow indeed exploded with economic activity soon after legalization of private enterprise in 1991, primarily as a result of the formation of new businesses that quickly outpaced privatization of state enterprises. Moscow had 195,020 establishments by 1995 compared to only 31,013 in 1991, over 600% growth in 4 years (Administrativnye… 1996, p.23). Figure 1 illustrates this growth by mapping urban establishments in 1989 (prior to privatization) against those in 1995 (after privatization) in a portion of downtown Moscow (see Pavlovskaya 2002 for details). The neoliberal explanation (see section 2.2) would proudly attribute such rapid expansion of capitalism to creation of private property and taking the economy out of the state’s control.

My alternative explanation sees Moscow capitalism as a product of multiple practices of property with non-capitalist controls over urban space playing a major role. These geographies are now hidden by the consequent reinvestments of capital but returning to the first post-privatization years makes it clear that it is the state institutions that made room for capitalism.

**4.1 Searching for spaces of capitalist production**

Shortly after privatization, hundreds of new establishments appeared virtually overnight. They all needed office or commercial space to start their operation but back then Moscow literally had no room to accommodate them. Compared to Western capital
cities, office and commercial space was scarce even in downtown areas. Finding such space quickly became a question of survival for new private enterprises. In the neoliberal world, the real estate market would respond to the demand but this market still was in the initial stages of its formation. The small amount of office space that did exist was also beyond market reach. It was occupied by the Soviet-era state agencies, the alleged archenemies of capitalism.

In this situation, new private businesses had to either create their own office space or find access to the already existing Soviet-era offices. The first option was logistically difficult. While in the West land and the structures on it are usually sold as a unit (Sawyer 2001; Overchuck 2001; Schwirtz 2009), in Russia privatization of apartments, buildings, and land proceeded in stages resulting in their separate ownership. Then-mayor of Moscow Luzhkov preferred leasing land to sales. Keeping land in municipal property allowed using it as an instrument of power (Interfax News Agency 1999; Munro 2001) as well as collecting more money through leases than one-time sales. A land cadastre, irrelevant during Soviet times, but necessary for land privatization did not exist either (Interfax News Agency 1999; Pagonis and Thornley 2000; Munro 2001). The uncertainty with land ownership led to slow sales of buildings and conversion to office space. Most importantly, however, conversion was prohibitively expensive, especially for small independent businesses, that simply could not divert so much capital from their operational budget (Seixas 1992; Kniazkov and Onishchenko 1993; see also Smith 2005).

Accessing existing office space, the second option, provided a comparable challenge. With “socialist property” relations already abolished, new rules for ownership were still vague and the properties of Soviet agencies were not part of the real estate
market. In most cases, Moscow administration asserted municipal ownership of land, municipal enterprises and their buildings. At the same time, numerous Soviet, Russian, regional and local government authorities such as ministries, industrial corporations and export companies as well as foreign embassies and the headquarters of the Communist party and Komsomol also had their offices in central Moscow. While a type of “socialist” property in the past, post-Soviet jurisdiction over them (e.g. municipal, regional, or federal), however, has not been established yet (the law requiring such delineation was not adopted until 2001 and the process of delineation is still on-going (O razgranichenii ... 2001; Schwirtz 2009)). Although these institutions could not claim property rights in either socialist or capitalist sense, they continued to hold the keys to their buildings (Boulton 1993; Munro 2001) that were to become the most valuable real estate in the capital. Besides the office space, these buildings possessed the business infrastructure - such as land phone lines, typing machines, computers, printers, and fax and xeroxing machines – which was rare at the time. In the era before cell-phones and the internet, it was also practically impossible for a small business to get its own phone landline. The Soviet institutional buildings, therefore, were the only viable business spaces in the city.

Thus, the rapidly growing capitalist economy was space-poor while Soviet-era agencies were space-rich. Desperately needed for capitalist production, yet located outside capitalist relations, their spaces could not be reached through market mechanisms. The two ideologically incompatible systems existed in presumably incongruent spaces governed by presumably incongruent practices of property.
4.2 Incubating capitalism on state socialist grounds

Mapping the geographies of early private enterprises together with those of state agencies reveals, however, that their office locations are not spatially apart, as one would expect, but consistently overlap down to the street address (Figure 2). This suggests that – paradoxically – Moscow’s first capitalist enterprises began growing within the spaces still controlled by Soviet-era state agencies or their post-Soviet reincarnations. It is in these spaces that opposing practices of property converged to assist capitalist expansion.

Figure 2 around here

Because of restricted access, only certain private businesses could enter the offices of the Soviet agencies and survive in their first years of operation. Were these the best performing private companies? Or, did this process have little to do with the competitive bidding for the prized locations?

Russian law allows individuals (“physical persons”), institutions (“legal persons”), or their combination to start a private business. Despite their supposed opposition to capitalism, the Soviet state agencies did not disband or hamper privatization but began creating private enterprises using their own social and human capital. The corporate ownership remains opaque in Russia but recent research supports my own conclusion from the fieldwork that behind the scenes the ownership by the state agencies often combined with that of private individuals who are most often “insiders” to the firm (Chernykh 2008). The geographic evidence below explains the important role of urban space in expansion of this particular type of capitalism in Moscow.

The fusion of state and private enterprises has brought many advantages to the newly created private firms. It allowed them to trade or barter the commodities (e.g.,
natural resources or manufactured goods) of their parent state agencies and use their business networks. Most importantly, however, the state agencies literally acted as “incubators” of capitalism by letting the related private enterprises to operate from within the walls of the state buildings. By crowding into the state offices, these enterprises received office space, business infrastructure, and symbolic capital without having to invest. This is evident in overlapping geographies of similar Soviet and post-Soviet enterprises such as Moscow television advertising agencies and technical consultancy firms (Kolossov et al. 2002). But beyond that, the human and social capital of state workers in conjunction with access to space assured a quick entrance of their private companies into the most dynamic and profitable new capitalist sectors. Figure 2, for example, makes it clear that during this period, the largest concentrations of financial services, wholesale trade, telecommunications, and direct international commerce formed precisely at the locations of the most powerful Soviet-era state agencies and political organizations.

Thus, the ministry of forestry of the USSR (Minlesprom), the sole tenant in a large building in 1989, by 1995 already shared its premises with twenty-eight businesses pursuing activities (Table 1) related to forestry, wood products, or furniture manufacturing. In addition, the same building had offices of many highly specialized producer services such as professional, information, computer-based, and financial services (all with forestry-related names). Other high demand and seemingly unrelated activities included firms dedicated to construction, real estate, training in the new market economy, and tourism. A foreign business also located there. These were likely spin-offs
created by the ministry’s employees or renters allowed into such an advantageous location because of personal connections.

Table 1 around here

Equally telling is the evolution of the headquarters of *Komsomol*, the Youth Communist League, into major hubs of capitalism. With mandatory membership of millions of young people aged 14-28, *Komsomol* served as a source of the future Communist Party leadership. Its energetic and motivated leaders immersed themselves in the initial perestroika-era entrepreneurial activities (the so-called “*komsomol* economy”) that provided them the exclusive privilege to cash money and import duty free items under the umbrella of “technical and scientific creativity of the youth” (Kryshtanovskaya 1995; Kryshtanovskaya and White 2002; Klebnikov 1994). This prepared them logistically and financially for the coming of capitalism. Four former *Komsomol* buildings in this area became particularly fertile spawning grounds for about sixty commercial, financial, and producer services establishments in 1995 (Figure 3). The Central Soviet *Komsomol* office sheltered the largest concentration. The *Komsomol* premises provided proximity to the Kremlin, access to premium office space, security guards, and an exclusive business infrastructure already updated during the years of *Komsomol* economy. A gun shop at the first floor of this building and a shady restaurant in the place of its dining hall indicate that ethical considerations did not limit the entrepreneurial spirit of *Komsomol* leaders. In contrast to private companies sponsored by state agencies, small independent entrepreneurs lacked resources, space, and logistical support while facing high start up costs, high rents, corrupt bureaucrats, and overpriced credit (Seixas 1992; Kniazkov and Onishchenko 1993; Williams and Round 2008;
author’s interviews) making it clear the impossibility of the “fair and transparent” privatization advocated by the neoliberal economists (Sachs 1992).

Figure 3 around here.

My analysis of urban privatization illuminated the role of multiple spatialized practices of property in the production of capitalism in Moscow. Private property alone has not transformed the ordinary Soviet citizens into the owners of the successful enterprises. It is its combination with a non-capitalist practice of property of the Soviet era (e.g., state controls over urban space extended into post-socialism) that secured the growth of capitalist enterprises connected to former structures of power. The neoliberal assertion that private property and capitalism possess inherent and superior vitality as well as the presumed dichotomy of capitalism and the state have worked to enable and conceal the connection of capitalism to non-capitalist practices of property. The next section examines another fluid combination of practices of property that may result in a potentially viable non-capitalist economy.

5 Re-inventing indigenous reindeer economies

From urban Moscow we move to the sparsely populated northern regions of Russia. They are home to indigenous nations whose traditional economies include fishing, forest products harvesting, and reindeer herding. Despite fierce resistance by the indigenous peoples, Russian influence in the area has intensified since the 11-12th centuries when the first Russians arrived. Military conquest in the 17th century, conversion to Christianity during the 18th century, and finally the formalization of imperial rule in the 19th century solidified Russian political and economic control over the
territory (Ravna 2006; Diatchkova 2001). Because of the marginal agricultural potential of these territories, there was little conflict over their use per se. The Russian empire left the traditional economies largely intact, preferring to rule through the existing communal structures (Diatchkova 2001).

5.1 Traditional economies and Soviet farms

Figure 4 around here

The Soviet aspiration to forge the indigenous peoples as modern nations has had contradictory results (for varying perspectives see Diatchkova 2001; Ravna 2006; Anderson 1998, 2006; Blackwelder 2008; Dallmann et al. 2010; Hirsh 2000; Kaiser 1997). On the one hand, several indigenous nations received autonomy over their vast homelands (e.g., the Nenets, Komi, Evenki, and Khanty-Mansi). These autonomous indigenous regions occupied half of the territory of Soviet Russia. The area of Nenets Autonomous okrug formed in 1929, for example, includes 180,000 sq.km stretching almost 1,000 kilometers west-east. The ethnic Nenets comprise less than 6% of its population (Figure 4; calculated from Dallmann et al. 2010, p. 18). The Soviet state tasked itself with simultaneously preserving and modernizing indigenous economies as well as transforming them on the “socialist” basis. The reindeer husbandry remained the dominant industry but had to conform to the Soviet model of the large-scale collective farming. The reindeer, previously owned communally by families or clans, became a collective property of the entire farm while the indigenous people became collective farm members. They had access to transportation vehicles and other infrastructure of the farm. The individual families also continued to own a few of their own reindeer which grazed
with the collective’s herds while the working units – brigades – often consisted of family or clan members with the elders and other respected individuals appointed as brigade leaders. The Soviet farms thus partially incorporated the communal structure (Petrov 2008; Klokov et al. 2004; for specific details on Sami sovkhoz see Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2006a, b; for Evenki sovkhoz see Anderson 1998 and Blackwelder 2008; for Nenets in NAO see Dallmann et al. 2010; for Nenets in Yamal, see Stammler 2005; for situation in Yakutia see Klokov 2001 and in Chukot district Gray 2006).

Like the Russian empire, the Soviet government held northern territories in state ownership and provided the indigenous peoples with use rights (usufruct), an arrangement that resembled the principle of the traditional commons (see Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2006b, p.120). Although the boundaries of the Soviet farms somewhat decreased flexibility of migrations, they closely followed the shape of seasonal migratory routes that spanned hundreds of miles north-south (Figure 3; cf. Habeck 2002). Like their ancestors, the brigades migrated in the northern tundra in the summer and in the winter returned to modernized villages where their children attended schools.

On the other hand, the indigenous people saw the state-led collectivization as another colonization attempt (Ravna 2006; Diatchkova 2001). The control of surplus distribution also went from the herders themselves to the administration of the farm (for various views of exploitation under the Soviet system see Burawoy and Krotov 1993; Resnick and Wolff 2002) often consisting of ethnic Russians. Finally, the goal of these farms was to support large-scale production of reindeer meat for northern mining towns and ports that undermined herders’ spiritual relationship with the environment expressed
in practice of “knowing the land” (Anderson 1998; Stammler 2005; Blackwelder 2008). The state supplied transportation, fuel, and veterinary expertise required for maintaining large populations of reindeer and provided education, housing, and healthcare for the herders and their families. In short, the Soviet system expanded reindeer economy but the indigenous practices of property and relationship with the environment have considerably changed.

5.2 Neoliberal reforms and indigenous economies

Privatization had a profound impact on indigenous societies. Most immediate and visible was a steep decline of reindeer husbandry across the northern territories with herds diminishing by half or more and in some cases becoming wild (Gray 2006; Anderson 2006; Klokov 2001, 2010; Dallmann et al. 2010). The Soviet supporting mechanisms including state financing, government contracts, provision of helicopter and other transportation services, deliveries of fuel, and supply of specialists were abruptly terminated. Standards of living of the indigenous people have precipitously deteriorated as well, forcing many to abandon their ways of life (Klokov 2001; Sulyandziga et al. 2003; Petrov 2008; Kovarsky 2009; Danilova 2009; Dallmann et al. 2010). A noted exception has been Yamal peninsula in Western Siberia where many fully nomadic communities had never joined the Soviet farm system and were not affected by its destruction (Stammler 2005; Klokov 2010).

____________________

1 Yasavey, the name of the Nenets NGO I will mention later, stands for “a guide knowing the area very well” (Dallmann et al. 2010, p. 18).
Despite the decline of reindeer husbandry and impoverishment, indigenous peoples have not fully abandoned their ways of life. Instead, they began to restore them within a new socio-political context and in solidarity with the international indigenous movements (e.g., Anderson 2006; Stammler 2005; Dallmann et al. 2010; Ravna 2006). The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East (RAIPON), for example, helps to negotiate the double pressures of Russian nationalism and neoliberalism.

While the Soviet farming models have no longer been enforced, the move to capitalism has presented the indigenous nations with new challenges. The communal production and spiritual treatment of nature do not fit well with the logics of private property and profit maximization. Private land ownership with its bounded territories and restricted access does not accommodate long-distance seasonal migrations as well as variable routes that reduce environmental risks (Stammler 2005; Anderson 2006). The indigenous economies, therefore, require special legal protections from the Russian state that itself is in the pursuit of privatization and liberalization.

The analysis below shows that despite these challenges the indigenous peoples have transformed neoliberal privatization into an opportunity to pursue economies that are antithetical to neoliberalism (cf. Lewis 2009). In particular, they have employed multiple practices of property to reinvent their communal economies and distance themselves from the neoliberal state.
5.3 Clan communities (*obshchina*), their enterprises and territories

The initial post-Soviet legal void with respect to indigenous rights began to close when the presidential decree of April 22, 1992 established the so-called Territories of Traditional Nature Use (TTNU). It defined TTNU as historic habitats of the indigenous peoples and designated their clan communities (“*rodovye obshchiny*” in Russian) as subjects of priority use rights within TTNU (O neotlozhnykh … 1992; Danilova 2009; Brezhneva 2009). The 1993 Russian Constitution and three federal laws further defined the status of the indigenous peoples (O garantiyakh … 1999; Ob obshchikh... 2000; O territoriyakh … 2001). By 2007, 40 federal laws and about 250 regional laws included norms protecting their rights (see Kryazhkov and Murashko 2007).

These protections are given to the group of over 40 “numerically small indigenous peoples” with population less than 50,000 which the Russian government considers to be in danger of extinction (O garantiyakh … 1999; Diatchkova 2001; Petrov 2008; Nikitina 2009). Thus, Sami, Nenets, Evenki, and Khanty-Mansi are granted the status but not the larger indigenous nations of Sakha and Komi.²

² The fact that only indigenous nations with a population under 50,000 have priority use rights to their homelands means that similar but larger groups such as Komi, Yakuts, and Karels, for example, do not have federally mandated rights to their traditional economies and territories. This contradiction seems to be addressed in two ways. First, in some cases, regional laws are being adopted in support of traditional economies (e.g., in Komi, Saha, and some other places). Second, the larger nations experience internal differentiation and use, for example, census to make the case that they
The laws define “rodovye obshchiny” as self-organized communities of indigenous people related by blood or using the same territory with a purpose to protect their habitats, traditional ways of life, economy and culture (Ob obshchikh … 2000; Danilova 2009; Brezhneva 2009; Nikitina 2009). Besides priority use rights (see section 5.4), obshchiny receive reserved quotas for harvesting traditional biological resources such as wild animals, fish, and plants (Brezhneva 2009; Nikitina 2009),

Self-organization into *obshchiny* began as soon as the first law took effect in 1992. Varying in size from just a few to all families in a region, they exist in all indigenous territories, combine nomadic herders and village residents, elect their own leaders, many of whom are women, and can form regional associations (Stammler 2005; Ershov 2007; Kovarsky 2009; Danilova 2009; Klokov 2010). There are hundreds of obshchiny in Russia today but their number varies significantly by region (Klokov 2001; Stammler 2005; Dalllmann et al. 2010, p. 136; Novosti Metainfo 2010).

Because they revoke traditional social and territorial organization, it is tempting to see *obshchiny* as a return to pre-Soviet indigenous societies. Yet, they reference the traditional organization without replicating it. The Russian term “*obshchina*” refers to communal organization in general, not a specific indigenous institution. According to Danilova (2009), *obshchiny* became popular because the Russian authorities made them the subject of the indigenous priority use rights thinking that institutions based on blood relations (this is what “rodovye obshchiny” means) still play the primary role in the qualify for the status of a numerically small indigenous nation (e.g., the case of Komi-Izhemts and Pomors).
indigenous societies. The ethnographic research, however, indicates that blood-based institutions had largely disappeared by the 1960-1970s as a result of systematic settling and grouping of nomadic herders into larger collective farms (Danilova 2009). Thus, while indigenous people do not necessarily identify with the official notion of “obshchina,” they use it strategically within the new political and economic context.

In particular, obshchina provides an opportunity to re-create indigenous practices of property within the post-Soviet legal framework. Legalization of private farming and private land ownership in Russia meant to encourage farm workers to take their shares from disbanded socialist farms and become Western-style individual private farmers. As of today, however, private farmers own less than 4% of privatized agricultural land (calculated by author from Rosreestr 2012) and contribute less than 7% of agricultural production (Major indicators … 2012). Even these private farms often are family businesses with shared ownership. But most importantly, when faced with a choice to become individual farmers or collective shareholders, most Soviet farms continued as producer cooperatives or farmer-owned joint stock companies that sometimes specifically refuse to sell their shares to outside interests (Rogers 2006). In fact, privatization laws have allowed for an unexpected, given the neoliberal emphasis on private ownership typical for a capitalist enterprise, variation of organizational forms with options for collective and worker ownership. As a result, two decades since Soviet property was destroyed and private property was enacted, non-capitalist agricultural enterprises own
most privatized land, account for most agricultural output in Russia, and constitute a major mechanism for survival, a primary source of local social capital and infrastructural support, and a de facto structure for ethical local governance (see Rogers 2006; Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2006a; Wegren 2000; Dallmann et al. 2010; Stammler 2005).

The initial 1992 degree allowed obshchiny to create indigenous enterprises based on traditional livelihoods (CONFRIM). Like other Russian agricultural enterprises, obshchiny used multiple property practices re-organizing indigenous economies into private enterprises, cooperatives, joint stock companies, and municipal enterprises (Gray 2006; Klokov 2010; Stammler 2005). As with the overall Russian agricultural output, cooperative enterprises account for the bulk of reindeer production. Their herds consist of rejoined shares of the reindeer of their parent Soviet farm and they usually kept use rights to the same pastures (Dallmann et al. 2010; Klokov 2010; Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2006a, b; Habeck 2002), preserve the Soviet family-based brigade structure (Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2006b; Kovarsky 2009; Anderson 2006; Blackwelder 2008). The cooperatives continue to supply housing, transportation, and other machinery

3 This includes subsistence plots for personal consumption inherited from Soviet times that occupy over 4% of agricultural land but contribute 49 % of agricultural output (ROSSTAT 2011) and the former state farms that hold three quarters of the private agricultural land in the form of shares (also see Limonov 2009) and generate another 44 % of agricultural output (ROSSTAT 2011).
and services to their members (Anderson 1998; Konstantinov and Vladimirova 2006a; Blackwelder 2008; Kovarsky 2009). In some cases, reindeer enterprises became municipally owned with workers being government employees (Kovarsky 2009). In Sakha, for example, the government owns all shares (Klokov 2001) while in Chukotka it holds a majority of enterprise shares (Gray 2006). Private enterprises are less common (Dallmann et al. 2010) and, as elsewhere in Russia, most are family ventures with shared ownership. What is clear is that instead of becoming privately owned capitalist enterprises, the Soviet-era reindeer collective continued to function as collective economies.

Another important change came when the 2000 law redefined “obshchiny” as entities that must preserve the indigenous ways of life on a non-profit basis (Ob obshchikh … 2000). This new status allowed for combining sizable tax benefits of non-profit organizations with benefits of the indigenous communities themselves (e.g., use rights to TTNU and quotas to resources). Obshchiny that formed after 2000, therefore, are no longer commercial entities; in contrast to earlier indigenous enterprises, they cannot generate and self-allocate profit (Klokov 2010; Stammler 2005). Because in the current economy the tax benefits of non-profits outweigh potential profits, obshchiny commonly re-register as non-profit organizations (Danilova 2009; Brezhneva 2009). Because this may change in the future, some activists believe that the current law, while providing important protections, undermines the economic opportunities of the indigenous enterprises (personal interview with RAIPON, 2011).

The bottom line, however, is that all property and organizational forms are used by indigenous obshchiny to facilitate the working of their communal economies and
maintain traditional livelihoods (personal interview in RAIPON, 2011). These economies do not maximize wealth, as a capitalist enterprise would, and do not equalize wealth either (e.g., families own different quantities of reindeer or fish). *Obshchiny* distribute the resources harvested from the common pastures and fishing grounds such that all members receive a certain share. In addition, *obshchiny* seek to increase their income by complementing the traditional livelihoods with tourism and other related modern economic practices (Ershov 2007; see KhMAO Official website (2011a) for a list of the current livelihoods of the Khanty-Mansi people).

Being a product of privatization but also embracing non-capitalist practices of property, indigenous economies occupy the contradictory position within the neoliberal space-economy. Instead of maximizing profit, they employ both private and collective forms of ownership to recreate the communal economy. Operating on the state owned land, *obshchiny* use their territories not as private pastures but as “the commons” for the indigenous enterprises as well as individual hunters and fishermen (Anderson 1998). In other words, obshchiny re-created the indigenous practices of property as a result of privatization but in contrast to its neoliberal intent.

### 5.4 Protecting territory from capitalism

For the first time in Russian history, neoliberalization has provoked a deep conflict not over control but the use of the indigenous territories. Most reindeer pastures remain in state ownership and comprise over 50% (105.6 million hectares) of non-cultivated agricultural land in Russia (Federal’ny portal, 2012). While agriculturally marginal, these areas contain mining and oil and gas extraction sites of national and
global significance. No federal laws, however, regulate reindeer husbandry per se and the official landuse categorization does not contain a category for “reindeer pasture land” (Kovarsky 2009). Classified as forest (Federal’ny portal, 2012; see also Habeck 2002, p. 130) pastures lack protections granted to farmland in the face of competition from other landuses.

As a result, obshchina becomes a sole means of protecting the spaces within which indigenous practices of property can be enacted from competing use claims. Most such claims in the Arctic come today from the private oil and gas industry. The importance of energy resources to the Russian economy has drastically increased in the last two decades precipitating a much more rapid advance of this industry into northern territories. As much as 90% of Russian gas is extracted from the Siberian Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrug which is also an area with the world’s largest managed reindeer herd (Stammler 2005). The livelihoods of nomadic Nenets herders that depend on seasonal migrations over thousands miles along specific routes and to specific pastures are perilously threatened because of the exceptional vulnerability of tundra ecosystems as well as disruptions of pastures and migration corridors caused by mining, pollution, transportation of machinery, and pipelines.

The Russian state owns both the subsoil resources and land and is in charge of granting private oil and gas companies the exploration and extraction licenses to particular sites. At the same time, the law grants obshchiny priority use rights within the Territories of Traditional Nature Use (TTNU) and allows for other uses only upon negotiation with the indigenous communities. The latter also must be compensated for destruction of their habitats. (O territoriyakh … 2001; Danilova 2009; Dallmann et al.)
2010). The economic rights of both obshchiny and the oil and gas industry are thus explicitly defined with respect to specific territories making clear the link between practices of property and spaces of their actualization. The geographies of these practices of property collide as do their opposing logics.

Figure 5 around here

As is evident from Figure 5, the spaces of the indigenous reindeer herding economies in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug stretch along the established migration routes while territories licensed to oil companies have bounded rectangular shapes that cut the boundaries of TTNUs. The map reveals the magnitude of the appropriation of indigenous territories by private oil and gas sector. Similarly, in another Autonomous Okrug inhabited by Khanty-Mansi people (KhMAO), 44% of indigenous territories have been reallocated to mining (Figure 6; KhMAO Official website (2011b). Additional threats come from privatization of land by other farmers and urbanites seeking summer homes (Dallmann et al. 2010, Anderson 1998; Kovarsky 2009).

Figure 6 around here

Oil and gas companies obviously enjoy the backing of the state because of their role in global energy markets. They often exploit the difficult socio-economic situation of indigenous peoples and get their permission for prospection and extraction in exchange for building infrastructure and providing helicopter transportation. The contracts often lack the necessary safeguards for environmental quality and reparation of destroyed land. In most cases, the benefits are marginal compared to the extensive and often irreversible damage to traditional herding grounds (Dallmann et al. 2010; Klokov 2010).
The balance of power is clearly uneven and yet obshchiny are those entities with whom the private companies must negotiate the terms of access. Few examples of successful negotiation on the part of indigenous communities exist (Stammler 2005) and increasingly obshchiny invite legal experts and other advocates to be part of these negotiations (Murashko, 2011, personal interview in RAIPON). Using their territorial rights is the only potentially fruitful possibility for the indigenous people to enforce claims to their habitats as well as secure compensation in case of their loss (Danilova 2009). The fact that obshchiny have established rights to territories, a special tax status, and reserved quotas for traditional biological resources such as wild animals, fish, and plants (Brezhneva 2009; Nikitina 2009) may play a crucial role in the future should these use rights be legally redefined as ownership rights as a result of a continued neoliberal push to land privatization (Klokov 2010; Stammler 2005). While strengthening the indigenous nations property claims in a pragmatic sense, further privatization would mean greater integration into the conservative system of property relations resulting in a loss of the radical potential of post-colonial politics (Wainwright and Bryan 2009).

To conclude, the major threat to indigenous ways of life today comes not from Soviet “legacies” seen by neoliberals as impediments to capitalist prosperity but from the very capitalist practices that the neoliberal Russian state enacted in the last two decades.

4 While it is beyond the scope of this paper, legalization of obshchina as subject of TTNU has encouraged the differentiation within the indigenous peoples in order claim separate ethnic identity as numerically small nations. An example is Komi-Izhemtsy who claim that being part of large Komi nation deprives them of rights to their territories.
While urban enterprises in Moscow have enlisted non-capitalist practices of property to secure their capitalist success, the indigenous peoples have utilized multiple practices of property within spaces of their collective territorial use rights to secure their communal economies and habitats threatened by advancing energy companies. While the future of this struggle is unclear, its success requires empowerment of alternative practices of property and non-capitalist economies. Many of them already exist and provide livelihoods for significant segments of population in Russia but remain sidelined by the prevailing neoliberal imaginary of the economy and its future paths as progressing to capitalism.

6 Conclusion

This article examined the multiple practices of property that have emerged as a result of a multifaceted sea change in property relations in Russia which was unwittedly triggered by the pursuit of a neoliberal privatization. Instead of a uniform shift from state to private ownership, diverse practices of property emerged that define access to the means of production, office space, natural resources, and land and create economic diversity where homogeneity was expected and encouraged.

The synergy of the post-soviet logics of property is open-ended and leads to paradoxical results. In Moscow, private enterprises thrived as a result of the persistence of Soviet era non-capitalist practices of property which allowed capitalist production to succeed in non-capitalist spaces. In reindeer herding societies, the combination of private enterprises, recreated Soviet-era cooperative farms, collective use rights to land, and re-deployment of traditional economic logics has led to the establishment of communally
operated indigenous economies. These constantly intermixing traditional, informal, customary, as well as private, collective, and state practices of property have created conditions in which the fragmented post-Soviet economic landscape has emerged. Because practices of property are always spatialized, their intricate geographies require close examination. Understanding how and where the layering of different practices of property occurs and how their combination generates particular forms of economy would usefully inform policy and political action.

The examples of early capitalist enterprises in Moscow and the reinvention of indigenous reindeer economies in the northern parts of Russia complicate the neoliberal narrative of post-socialist change. Understanding actually existing neoliberalism is an important task (Brenner and Theodore 2002) and even more important is to confront the homogenizing effect of its universalizing discourse that marginalizes economic diversity and deprives it of political visibility, resources, and legal support. Conceptualizing the economy as diverse, such that non-capitalism is present and has an important structuring (as in case of Moscow) and transforming (as in reindeer economies) effect, dislocates private property and profit seeking capitalist enterprise as the centerpiece of neoliberal ideology. The fact that the invisible hand of the market in Moscow had been guided by its supposed enemies - state agencies practicing Soviet-era practices of property, - suggests that capitalism is much more fractured and unsustainable than presumed by neoliberal orthodoxy. Similarly, the ability of indigenous economies to harness private property institutions for the sake of empowering their communal economies and potentially counteracting capitalist oil and gas enterprises reveals the incompleteness of neoliberal
ideological impacts as well as the porous, fragmented, and open to intervention nature of capitalism.

As in the West, the alignment of Russian economic discourse and policy with the neoliberal meaning of privatization continues to empower profit seeking capitalist enterprises while also disregarding the presence and significance of the many non-capitalist and socially-oriented practices of property, forms of economic organization, and logics of operation. Making them visible empirically and theoretically would facilitate the development of new legal and policy frameworks as well as social imaginations that shift the policy support and public desires from capitalism to economies pursuing ethics of social justice and environmental sustainability.
# Tables

**Table 1. Establishments in 1995 at the location of the Ministry of Forestry of the USSR.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of establishments:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Related to forestry in terms of:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Content of activity</td>
<td>Company name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total=28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters of forestry corporations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing of wood products, paper, treatment systems, furniture</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole sale firms (wood products, European furniture, office furniture)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export-import firms</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional services (research firms)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information (IT, data provider)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer maintenance and repairs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information (journal of forestry)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional organizations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finances and insurance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction firms</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>Unverified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (marketing and market</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist firm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign firm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unverified business</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Database of urban establishments compiled by the author.
References


Hann, C.M. & The “Property relations” group (2003) *The postsocialist agrarian question: property relations and the rural condition*, LIT Verlag Münster.


O territoriyakh traditsiannogo prirodopol`zovaniya korennykh malochislennykh narodov Severa, Sibiri i Dal`nego Vostoka Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 2001. Federal'nyi zakon
of 7 maya 2001 g. N 49-FZ. Available at http://base.garant.ru/12122856/,
accessed 6 February 2012. In Russian.


Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Anne Griffiths, eds.


Yurchak, A. (2005) Everything was forever, until it was no more: The last Soviet generation, Princeton University Press.
**Figures:**

Figure 1. Urban establishments in 1989 and 1995.

Circle size indicates the number of establishments at one address or a group addresses.

Figure 2. Locations with the largest growth in 1995 (16 addresses)

Figure 3. Komsomol headquater locations in 1995.

Note: Colors and numbers designate territories of traditional nature use (TTNU) allocated to different agricultural cooperatives most of which formed on the basis of the Soviet reindeer farms.

Figure 5. Oil industry and TTNU in NAO

Note: The protected areas of TTNU stretch north-south, while areas licensed for oil prospecting and extraction have rectangular shapes that intrude into the protected territories.

Figure 6. Areas licensed for oil and TTNU in KhMAO

Boundaries of obshchiny territories are shown in green, boundaries of the oil licensed areas – in blue.

Source: Adapted from KhMAO Official website (2011b).