PRIVATIZATION OF THE URBAN FABRIC: GENDER AND LOCAL GEOGRAPHIES OF TRANSITION IN DOWNTOWN MOSCOW

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Abstract: This article examines the outcomes of the transition to a market economy in downtown Moscow from the perspective of people living through this transformation. Moscow is ahead of the rest of the country if judged by the degree of privatization and the growth of the new private sector; however, the effects of urban restructuring on an urban society are contradictory and not as expected. We seek to understand how these changes in urban space reverberate in the everyday lives of Moscow households [Keywords: transition, urban restructuring, gender, everyday life, Moscow].

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990s, Russia has been painfully transforming itself from socialism to “capitalism by democratic design” (Offe, 1991). This process has involved attempts to democratize politics and to promote modern development by “returning” to the free market and private property.2 According to its proponents, private ownership will unleash the creativity of economic actors formerly suppressed by state regulation, revitalize the stagnant economy, and increase material prosperity throughout Russian society (Sachs, 1995). Lacking a long history of capitalist social regulation, Russia has sought to reinvent itself as a market-based society within the span of a few short years. In this sense, Russia offers an unusual opportunity to observe the ramifications accompanying a profound reorganization of economic life.

Moscow, the capital of Russia and the largest metropolis of the Soviet bloc, was a testing ground for many Soviet innovations in urban design and planning. Even Moscow, however, was plagued by the shortages of housing, consumer goods, and services that were widespread throughout centrally planned economies. To compensate for these shortcomings, people traded goods and services informally, relied on social networks for
meeting household needs, and spent large amounts of time in domestic work. To the extent that these informal arrangements replaced exchanges in the formal economy, one could consider Soviet society as having been “non-modern” (Rose, 1994).

In the 1990s Moscow became a source of “capitalist innovations” in Russia (Gritsai, 1997c; O’Loughlin et al., 1997). Privatization and the replacement of central planning with the free market coincided with post-industrial restructuring (the decline of manufacturing and expansion of services) already underway in Moscow (Gritsai, 1997b). In a way, Moscow leap-frogged from industrial socialism into post-industrial capitalism, where the “invisible hand of the market” was expected to eliminate the structural “distortions” of the Soviet system to the benefit of consumers. It is by now well known that this shift to free markets in Russia and Eastern Europe has not produced the expected transformation but instead has spawned multiple and unstable “post-communisms,” with the majority of people living in poverty and the distribution of economic, social, and political benefits sharply divided along the lines of class, gender, and ethnicity (Aage, 1994; Andrusz et al., 1996; Pickles and Smith, 1998; Funk and Mueller, 1993; Regulska, 1998; Meurs, 1998; Gendernye aspekt…, 1992; Corrin, 1992; Khotkina, 1992). Our study focuses on the crucial role of changes in the micro-geographies of everyday life in producing distinctly gender-differentiated impacts.

Our goal in this paper is to examine the transition to a market economy in downtown Moscow from the perspective of people living through this transformation. We seek to understand how the macro-economic policies shaping the transition have altered the urban fabric and how these changes in urban space reverberate in the everyday lives of Moscow households. Studies in other places as diverse as Quito, Ecuador (Lawson,
Nairobi, Kenya (Nelson, 1997), Montreal, Canada (Chicoine et al., 1992) and Worcester, Massachusetts (Hanson and Pratt, 1995) demonstrate that gender is a powerful organizer of the impacts of macro-level changes on people's everyday lives. How have gender ideologies shaped the transition in Moscow?

Investigating these questions requires close attention to the links between home and work and to the way these links and their geography are implicated in the gendering of work. It also requires shifting the focus of study to the local scale, the scale at which households engage with on-going changes in the urban fabric and deal with their outcomes. Using building-level data on urban land use change and in-depth interviews with members of 30 households, we examine the new geographies of downtown Moscow, produced by the rapid transition to a post-industrial market economy. We trace changes in class and gender relations inside these households triggered in part by transformation of the urban fabric. Has the booming private market improved households' access to goods and services, as was predicted? Has the importance of goods and services produced and consumed outside the formal market (e.g., in the informal money economy and in the domestic economy) decreased? How has the related restructuring of domestic work affected class and gender relations between household members and how has it shaped their position in the new market economy?

In the remainder of the paper, we first establish the context of the study by summarizing recent changes in downtown Moscow. We then examine the nature and extent of privatization of the urban fabric in the study area and its impacts on household labor. This detailed empirical analysis supports our conclusion that, instead of alleviating the economic problems of the Soviet era, post-Soviet capitalism in Moscow has created new
urban geographies that have reshaped gender relations and increased rather than decreased the time-space burdens of women’s everyday lives.

**ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING IN DOWNTOWN**

Under state socialism, urban land and housing markets did not exist and planning was a major driving force behind urban development. Thus, the “creative destruction” by capital, responsible for waves of urban change in Western cities, bypassed Moscow until the 1990s. Before the transition to capitalism, the state “owned” 90% of housing in the city as well as all institutions (including factories, universities, utilities, retail stores, laundries, schools, health clinics, daycare centers, theaters and so on). Planners located stores and services according to the demographic profiles of neighborhoods; once located, urban facilities remained in place for decades. Using the institution of propiska, city government restricted residential mobility as a way to handle housing shortages. People lived in the same place for long periods of time; neighborhood change was slow and people’s attachment to place -- their street or neighborhood -- was strong.

Because large-scale housing construction in Moscow did not begin until the 1960s, most working- and middle-class families lived for decades in old downtown buildings in subdivided, overcrowded apartments shared by several extended households (known as “communal” apartments). Blue-collar workers from outside Moscow, who filled the least desirable jobs in exchange for a Moscow residence permit, were given vacant rooms in communal apartments whose former residents had moved to new single-family units in high-rise housing projects on the city’s outskirts. Moscow also attracted a considerable amount of the new elite housing built since the 1970s. As a result, people from different classes, professions, ages, and ethnic groups lived in the same neighborhood, building,
and even the same communal apartment (Vendina, 1997). For example, a university professor could live in the same apartment with a working-class single mother, a retired elderly woman, and a family of a sales clerk. When an old building became totally unlivable, all inhabitants were resettled to new housing, and the upgraded building would be converted to government offices or commercial space. In general, the better infrastructure, prestige, and accessibility offered by a downtown location contributed to the concentration of all types of economic activities there, including manufacturing, services and state offices (Barbash, 1986).

Beginning in 1992, Moscow city government moved quickly to privatize the economy, triggering explosive growth in the new private sector. By 1997, more than 87% of all goods and services in Moscow were sold in the private sector, 62% of the workforce was employed in the non-government sector, and 45.2% of all apartments had been privatized by their residents for a small fee (Moskovsky…, 1998; see also Bater, 1996). Simultaneously, the number of enterprises operating in Moscow grew by 600%, with most of the growth occurring in the formerly underdeveloped tertiary sector. Although Moscow’s tertiary sector is still small compared to New York and Tokyo, its rate of growth is extremely high (Gritsai, 1997c).

Geographically uneven in its impact, this privatization has reinforced Soviet-era privileging of the city center. Since 1992, Moscow has been divided into 10 large territorial units called prefectures or administrative districts (Figure 1) that are in turn subdivided into smaller municipal districts. The Central District is considered the best approximation to the central city described by statistical data (Bater et al., 1998) although it spills beyond the historic downtown surrounded by Sadovaya Ring. Possessing only
6% of Moscow’s territory and 7% of its population (or 588,200 persons), the Central District is the smallest district. Its total employment, however, increased by 12% in seven years (1991-1997), the largest absolute increase in Moscow, and in 1997 it provided jobs to one-quarter of all people employed in the city (calculated from Administrativnye… in 1997). Table 1 reflects growth by sector in terms of the number of businesses in each sector. The total number of enterprises in the Central District increased by almost 750%, which accounts for 28% of growth across the city; moreover, the district concentrates 27% of all institutions and enterprises in Moscow. The tertiary sector, including retail/wholesale, dining, and health services, is growing the fastest. The Central District also has 40% of the unspecified “other” tertiary sector, which includes private market activities new to Moscow such as finance, insurance, real estate, consulting, etc. Although less important in the district’s economy, the remaining tertiary activities such as consumer services are still highly concentrated in the downtown.

Such spatially focused growth obviously stimulated demand for new office and commercial space in the central city, which prompted Moscow city government, like many entrepreneurial cities of the US (Leitner, 1989), to pursue large-scale redevelopment of the downtown in partnership with private capital. At the same time, the Central District remains home to 558,200 people, similar in demographic profile to the population of Moscow in terms of share of children (18%), working age individuals (57%), and average household size (2.6) (Administrativnye… in 1994). Although no data are available on the detailed socio-economic make-up of the downtown population, recent studies have shown that it retains its class diversity (Bater et al., 1994; Bater et al., 1998).
RESTRUCTURING OF URBAN SPACE AND HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIES

How have these profound changes in the urban fabric of downtown Moscow affected the people living there? Has the dramatic expansion of the tertiary sector benefited local households? Answers to these questions can be found only by looking at people’s daily lives at a spatial scale finer than that of the district to see how people make use of specific stores and services located in their neighborhoods. Furthermore, people consume basic goods and services not as individuals but as members of households; their need for local stores and services is determined by the needs of their families and their domestic responsibilities.

Geography matters most for those adults who must carry out diverse daily activities located in different places, e.g., taking a child to school, getting to and from work on time, doing the food shopping, taking a child to music lessons. Soviet gender and class ideologies resulted in a distinctly patriarchal distribution of these responsibilities, in which the man’s job was to bring in money while a woman’s job was to bring in money, do housework, and raise children. Thus, even a Russian woman-cosmonaut sees flying a spaceship as a “vacation” from cooking, doing laundry, and taking care of the children (MacWilliams, 1999). In single-parent households, grandmothers did a large share of domestic and childcare-related work. As primary housekeepers, women (and women employed outside the home in particular) were the most dependent on local urban geographies. Also, past shortages of consumer goods and services, which resulted in much time and effort being spent on meeting daily household needs (shopping, cooking, cleaning, washing and so on), affected women most adversely. If, indeed, the private
tertiary sector is better able to respond to consumer demand than were Soviet planners, women should be the prime beneficiaries of the new market alternatives to housework.

To understand the effects of privatization on households we focus on land use changes in the study area in Central District. The analysis draws upon two sets of data collected in 1995 by one of the authors. One consists of digital spatial databases that enabled the analysis of change in the built environment at the scale of buildings; the other involves in-depth interviews with residents of the study area, which enable assessment of the impacts of these changes on daily life. In addition, we use statistical data and information provided by local administrations in Moscow.

**STUDY AREA AND SAMPLE**

Located in Central District, the study area has all the major features of Soviet and post-Soviet downtown Moscow. It includes a central portion of Basmannoye Territorial Upravlenie (BTU--Basmannoye Territorial District). BTU is the easternmost of the ten wedge-like municipal districts of the Central District (Figure 1). They surround the administrative and commercial core, the district called Kitai-gorod that includes the Kremlin. Myasnitskaya (former Kirova) Street coincides with the boundaries of BTU in the North, Podkolokol’ny and Vorontsovo Pole (former Obukha) Streets – in the South. Sadovaya Ring is the boundary of downtown in the east. Myasnitskaya, Maroseika (former B. Khelmistskogo), and Pokrovka (former Chernyshevskogo) Streets are major commercial and business axes formed long before the Soviet period. BTU’s current population exceeds 80,000 persons (Moskovsky…1998).

**Figure 1. Study area in the city of Moscow**
Like Central District of which it is a part, the study area retains a traditional mixture of manufacturing, services, administration, education, culture, and science. Many buildings here have mixed uses (commercial or office space on the first floor and in the basement, residential spaces on upper floors). Residential neighborhoods adjacent to major streets are socially heterogeneous and have high densities. Interspersed with pre-revolutionary two-to-five story buildings with communal apartments are high-rise elite residences and recently gentrified housing. Public transportation is the major mode of travel.

Privatization has created sweeping changes in the study area, as it has throughout the downtown. The total number of businesses here grew from 816 in 1989 to 2,904 in 1995, increasing the intensity of use of this territory almost fourfold in five years. Analyzing the transformation of the urban fabric involved comparing non-residential building uses (or enterprises in various economic sectors) in the study area in 1989 (before privatization) with those in 1995 (after the major thrust of privatization). For this purpose, two matching databases of building uses for 1989 and 1995 were derived from telephone books and tied to a digital map of the study area.

These spatial data were complemented by 45 in-depth interviews conducted in the spring-summer 1995 with men and women from 30 households who live in the area. The households were randomly selected from a stratified sample to represent two-parent and single-parent households with children in grades 1-3. Because these parents need to combine income earning with domestic and child-raising responsibilities, they have had perhaps the most multifaceted transition experiences of any group. At the same time, households with young children are an important part of the Central District where 18% of residents are children under 16 years old (in BTU their share is 21%), the average
household size is 2.64, and over 50% of households have three or more persons. The importance of single-parent households is illustrated by the fact that, in addition to the high divorce rate, one-quarter of all children born in Moscow in 1997 were born to unmarried women (Moskovsky... 1998).

The housing conditions, educational backgrounds, and occupations of adults in the interviewed households reflect the past and present social diversity of the downtown population. Half of the interviewed households lived in communal apartments; most of these families had migrated to Moscow to take blue-collar jobs in exchange for a residence permit. The remaining Soviet middle- and upper-class families had separate apartments. Members of sample households ranged from blue-collar workers to private firm owners and researchers and worked in various economic sectors (from manufacturing to finances). They worked for wages in the private and the state sectors, earned cash informally and were unemployed and/or full-time housekeepers; about half had changed occupation since 1989. As the study area is relatively small, all households shared essentially the same urban environment. Among other things, the interviews focused on changes in people’s use of locally provided services and consumer goods as well as the implications of these changes for class and gender processes within households and the larger economy.

We begin by summarizing the recent changes through a focus on the household of Antonina, a former engineer in a toy factory, and her husband Pavel, a former college teacher. Their family situation exemplifies many facets of households’ transition experiences.
Antonina and Pavel

Pavel and Antonina live with their three children in a three-room downtown apartment and have no plans to move. In addition to its central location, their separate apartment is in a high-quality showcase building built in the Stalin era. Optimistic about perestroika, they tried several times to start their own small business but existing tax law made it impossible to succeed. As prices rose after 1992, they found their incomes inadequate to support their three children and they had to look for better paying jobs in the private sector. After a long job search, Pavel finally found work as a salesperson with a private food processing company, a job that enables him to support his family. As the mother of three young children, Antonina could not count on finding a private sector job. The couple decided that instead of working she should become a full-time housekeeper; they negotiated their responsibilities as follows. Pavel earns the income, vacuums on Sunday, and helps Antonina with food shopping. To save money on food, they never eat outside the home; the children eat free lunches at school, which is a benefit for “large families.” Antonina cooks “all day every day” and also makes large quantities of food preserves (jams, pickles, and fruit drinks). She cleans during the week and does dishes, although the children help with these tasks. She walks the children to school and back and supervises them after school to avoid paying extra money for after-school time. Antonina also knits and makes all of the family’s clothes, using a new sewing machine that they bought for this reason; they only purchase shoes. To avoid using dry cleaning and laundry services, the couple bought a new automatic washer in addition to their old one. Antonina does all the laundry at home and irons everything with a hand iron. In addition, she cuts her husband’s and children’s hair and is searching for a cheaper hair salon for herself.
This story is striking in many respects. In particular, while the private market is expanding, this household’s goal is to avoid formal consumption of everyday goods and services. Second, Antonina's transition to full-time housekeeping is a strategy that enables her household to survive while undermining her future access to professional work. Antonina and Pavel’s story exemplifies several important transition-related processes that we examine systematically now.

**URBAN CHANGE IN THE STUDY AREA**

Table 2, which describes changes in the tertiary sector in the study area between 1989 and 1995, reveals that privatization has brought explosive growth to only certain parts of that sector. First, the highest rates of growth are clearly confined to the new private tertiary sector, which has quickly gained prominence in the post-Soviet landscape. This fast-growing sector consists of various foreign firms, banks, tourist firms, currency exchange places, financial consulting firms, and wholesale companies that were absent in the Soviet urban economy. This change has been noted in the literature as typical for downtown Moscow (Gritsai, 1997a). Second, services that meet households’ basic needs have not become more widely available, despite their overall scarcity in the past. For example, daycare centers, health clinics, hair salons, and dry cleaning and laundry drop-off centers have decreased in number. Those services that can potentially replace especially time-consuming domestic work performed by women (e.g., laundry services and daycare centers) have declined the most. Finally, some consumer-oriented tertiary activities such as dining, retail stores, and repair services have experienced impressive growth, suggesting that shopping, cooking, and cleaning should now be less stressful and time-consuming than they were previously. These changes remain largely unnoticed and
their implications for local residents are unclear. Using the interview data, we investigate the links between the privatization of urban public space and the daily lives of local households.

*Childcare-related services*

Raising school-age children involves intensive use of the local environment and, often, adjustments to adults' work schedules. Taking children to and from school and to after-school activities, feeding them lunch and dinner, supervising homework, washing and ironing their clothes are structured, repetitive daily responsibilities. They last for years and require commitments that exceed those of a job. Working household members who also care for children are especially deeply rooted in the geography of childcare-related services that restrict their access to potential jobs. In a majority of cases, these household members are women.

*Daycare centers and schools*

In Soviet Moscow, a whole system of neighborhood daycare centers, schools, and after-school activities served to organize children’s time while parents were at work. These facilities had to be close to home and free. But parents in study households, whose children had attended daycare just one to three years before, remembered well that open slots were often lacking. Several women had had to take lower-paying jobs in the daycare centers or in the district administration in order to obtain daycare and a job. In this way, lack of locally available daycare facilities contributed to the gendering of employment and the deskilling of women.
In recent years, low birth rates have created a relative abundance of places in daycare centers. Between 1992 and 1995 in BTU, however, the number of children in state daycare centers increased by 35% (probably owing to in-migration and refugees) while the number of the facilities shrank by one, to 36. This again produced a shortage of slots, with the number falling from 1,280 to 936 per 1,000 children (Kharakteristika…, 1992, 1995). The study area, which had had roughly two-thirds to three-quarters of BTU’s daycare centers in 1989, had lost about one-third of them by 1995 (Table 2). New and exclusive private daycare services are rare and an option only for the extremely rich.

Erosion of the state daycare system, which had been heavily used by working women, clearly undermines their position in the labor market; this is especially the case for single parents.

School location has been a key factor in organizing household activity spaces both before and during the transition, because children are too young to walk to school by themselves.18 Although the nine public schools in the area are within a short distance of each other, in the process of choosing a school, three-quarters of interviewed households, had given more consideration to school proximity to home and lack of busy intersections between school and home than to quality of teachers, school reputation, or foreign language education. In fact, proximity was often the only factor parents considered, because it affected parents’ access to jobs. As one mother said, “There was another language school near Lubianka street, but I physically would not be able to get her there. To take her there in the morning, then go to work, then again run to pick her up … this would be physically impossible.” Because women are the default caretakers of children in most two-parent households, only their jobs were evaluated relative to school location.
In two interviewed families, the women had been able to secure their employment in the private sector only because their unemployed husbands or retired parents had taken over this task. Working single mothers relied on their children’s grandparents who, even if they lived far away, commuted daily or several days a week to pick up children from school. Finally, some single mothers relied on help from their neighbors, without whom they would have been unable to stay employed even in the state sector.

**After-school activities**

Under the Soviet system, various after-school activities such as music lessons, sports, art and theater classes, radio and photography classes, were provided in local cultural centers (Pioneer Palaces, Culture Clubs, museums, theaters) or in schools without charge; these activities were and still are extremely popular. The ability of a child to attend these activities has always depended on micro-geographies: they must be close enough to home for a child to walk safely or they must fit the schedule of an adult who cares for the child. Otherwise children are deprived of these activities, as in the case of Sonia and Igor, who have three daughters (4-8 years old) and live in one room of a communal apartment. Igor, a skilled carpenter, makes good money while Sonia has kept her low-paying factory assembly job because she is waiting for the separate apartment that was promised to her as a job benefit. She works shifts and takes care of all household tasks, but attending dancing classes with her daughter after school is a problem: “She’d love it but I cannot do it. If I go there with her, then I can’t cook dinner or check her homework. But first of all, my husband works, so, I need to put something on the table; I cannot feed him tea with sandwiches all the time, I have to cook a meal. I would not let her go by herself; I am afraid because she’d have to cross two big streets.”
The impact of the private market on after-school activities has been destructive because such facilities have become less accessible for local families both geographically and financially. Many programs have either died out because teachers were not paid a living wage or have been displaced by private businesses claiming space in downtown buildings. When private firms invaded a late 19th century mansion that had for decades functioned as a Pioneer Palace, parents became angry but felt helpless: “They say that the Pioneer Palace will be taken away from children by private businesses – they want to turn it into something else; one building has already been given up. Kids do not have a room for changing clothes and have to walk to dancing classes outside in their costumes, without warm clothes on. One building is already fenced off; the foreign firms who do the renovation will keep it to themselves. So, we are afraid that they will take the other one away too; you know how everything can be sold now.”

The private market offers some similar activities (new gyms, for example) but most households cannot afford them. Some parents, however, have begun educating children at home, which requires a strong commitment from at least one adult (usually a woman) who has to work part-time or quit the labor force. For instance, Nadya left her highly skilled job as an equipment assembler on telephone stations – a job she loved – to take a janitorial job because it gives her time to study with her son after school: “Well, first of all, many children’s activities are not free anymore, which immediately places us into the group of people with limited opportunities. We cannot afford everything. If I find out tomorrow that my son has a particular talent, I will not be able to do anything for him. Or, I would have to learn it first myself, as I learned English, and then teach it to my children. This is what I am doing now. Because I know that I cannot pay $10 for one
lesson. Somebody told me the other day: you will never forgive yourself losing your son and not developing his abilities, and I cannot object to that because I cannot provide him with what he needs.”

In sum, the market has not expanded the existing system of affordable childcare-related services although families do need them. Some inexpensive after-school activities that still survive “against the market” are driven only by the enthusiasm of the teachers. In general, such activities continue disappearing from the urban landscape and households’ access to these services declines. Alternatively, these activities move into the private spaces of households and the realm of unpaid domestic work, where a difficult tension arises between the needs to educate children and to earn a wage. Leaving formal employment to care for and educate children fundamentally changes the class position of women because they lose professional skills and subsequently have reduced options in the labor market.

*Shopping in local stores*

The geography, quality, and affordability of basic goods and services affect the amount of work involved in shopping, cleaning, and cooking – jobs which in Moscow households are universally done by women. Downtown Moscow used to have small, highly specialized stores whose locations had not changed for decades. They sold dairy products, bread, vegetables, meats, clothes, or electric appliances. Because refrigerators were small and shortages were ubiquitous, people who shopped on foot and carried their groceries in bags visited several stores daily on the way to and from work where buying one product involved waiting in several lines. At the same time, people knew how to shop with maximum efficiency and would buy scarce items for each other. They also
went to urban farmer markets on weekends to buy fresh, high-quality food sold at unregulated higher prices.

One-fourth of Moscow’s retail/wholesale businesses are concentrated in the Central district, and they have expanded considerably there in the recent years (Table 1). In the study area, too, the number of retail stores increased by 46% between 1989-1995 (Table 2), implying that the accessibility of local households to consumer goods and services should have improved. The interviews suggest, however, that this has not happened. First, some conveniently located stores have been turned into offices or stores of a different type. As a result, people now have to carry heavy bags farther, as does Nastia, a single mother who shares a household with her parents: “Now we have to do such mileage just to get potatoes and carrots. Running over there, well, is not that bad, but then you have to bring it back! And what if I have a large family? To make soup I need a half-bucket of everything! It’s like a labor camp! Is this called making good for people? I do not care about such good!” The disappearance of stores has forced some single mothers to rearrange domestic chores because they can no longer rely on their children for daily shopping. When Maria worked day shifts in an orphanage, her third-grade daughter did basic food shopping during the day: “Things changed such that they took away many of our stores, and replaced them with private ones. Here we had a store on the corner; it helped us out all the time, and we bought all of our groceries there. Now they have this “Gurman” [a new Western-style “gourmet” supermarket]. Before, I could at least send my child to buy eggs, but now I cannot because it is too far and she needs to cross the street.”
Second, many remaining stores and services have become outlets for unpredictable assortments of goods and services: a dry-cleaning outlet offers cosmetics, audio-equipment, and shoes; a hair salon sells CD’s; and an armed currency exchange operates in a laundry drop-off place. In addition, Russian-produced convenience goods have been universally replaced by imported items. As the number of stores and new goods multiply, people cannot buy their lightbulbs, thread, or buttons because these items do not bring enough profit to the sellers. Urban spaces that used to be familiar now generate confusion. “I have no idea where to buy thread. Before we had Galantereia [a household goods store], an electrical appliances store, but today it is a problem. What can I do with nice-looking store windows? They are not for everyday use, but all the small, simple things for everyday use – they are gone.” This, in turn, further undermines the collapsed domestic manufacturing and agricultural sectors and leaves people no choice but to purchase foreign-made goods and food. Furthermore, imported food products and consumer goods are high-priced, making food the single largest expenditure in 1995.\(^2\) Prior to the 1990s, the study households had spent most of their money on consumer durables and vacations.

In 1995, almost all labels were in foreign languages, leading people to feel like strangers in their own city – a postmodern experience that they did not appreciate: “Before, I knew where to go; I knew that I would buy this or that. Now there is nowhere to go. If some stores are still there, they sell only imported goods, and the prices are of course much higher. And, secondly, it’s all unfamiliar – it is hard to pay that much money and buy a cat in a bag – I am not that wealthy (laughs).” By 1999, most labels had been converted
to Russian, but basic goods, including meat, butter, milk, and vegetable oil, still were imported or produced by foreign-operated plants in Russia.

New Western-style supermarkets, where rich New Russians display their wealth by buying milk and parsley from Europe at European prices, symbolize these developments. Not surprisingly, the word “supermarket” for most respondents meant precisely the place where one does not want to go shopping: “Previously, I went to this store on the corner, but now there is a supermarket there, and I do not go there anymore. I also used to go to “store 40” [a large Soviet food store] but now I do not either, because I know that there is a supermarket there as well.”

To deal with such changes, respondents have turned to resources available to them outside the formal (this time private) sector. Instead of using city stores for basic shopping, they go to semi-formal urban markets. Unlike the situation in the past, domestically produced fresh food at farmers’ markets is now less expensive than food in stores; huge new “goods markets” sell cheap consumer goods supplied by informal shuttle-traders. In addition, families with rural relatives rely even more than in the past on food from the countryside that bypasses the market and therefore enables them to withdraw even further from consumption in the formal private sector.

In sum, the expansion of private retail stores has not improved the access of local residents to food and consumer goods. Familiar stores and consumer items are replaced by more expensive imported goods. Time spent shopping has not decreased because, according to respondents, instead of searching for goods, they now search for lower prices among stores and travel farther to the informal food and goods markets. In fact,
they minimize their use of the closest stores and instead rely on their families and informal urban markets.

*How do you do your laundry?*

Doing laundry and ironing is time-consuming and physically challenging domestic work. In Soviet Moscow, self-serve laundromats did not exist; clothes were collected through a network of laundry drop-off places, washed at large industrial laundries, and then returned a few days later to be picked up by the customer. Despite the apparent convenience, two-thirds of study households had entirely avoided using these services because the quality of washing was poor and clothes could be damaged, lost, or stolen. One interviewed woman had worked for some time at an industrial laundry and “knew” this first hand. In addition, despite the planning doctrine to distribute these services evenly, even in downtown Moscow laundry drop-off places often could not be found within walking distance of home. This had been the case for an interviewed mother of seven children who wanted to use these facilities but had not been able to find one.

Not using laundry services means washing and ironing everything with a hand iron in an urban apartment (including bedsheets, towels, etc.). In households with young children it is an especially time-consuming chore. Despite the physical challenge (tough tasks are “for men”), laundry and ironing have been women’s tasks. Although 90% of the sample households had washing machines, in 60% of them women did all or part of the laundry by hand. This astonishing situation is the combined result of developments in the tertiary sector and communal housing. For example, some households do not have washing machines at all because in Soviet times washing machines were hard to get and today few (six in the sample, all working in the private sector) can afford foreign-made automatic
washers. In addition, owners of Soviet washers still have to rinse and wring manually, which makes large washes difficult to handle. Furthermore, for those who live in a communal apartment it is inconvenient to install and remove the washing machine in a shared bathroom every time they want to do the laundry. Instead, women prefer to save time by washing clothes by hand in small batches almost every day. Apart from being prohibitively expensive for most families, imported washing machines are not high on the list of families’ priorities. Instead, they buy TV sets and VCRs and save on “free” women’s labor, as two-fifths of the interviewed households had done.

Clearly, a pressing need for affordable laundry services exists, but many privatized laundry centers have been converted to new uses, and no new laundry facilities have appeared in the study area. Some private laundry services operate citywide; they involve home pick-up and delivery and charge one-fifth of the average monthly wage for one shirt, placing these services beyond the reach of most households. Dry cleaning services, which had been regularly used in the past by 47% of the interviewed households, have become so expensive that respondents have either started “washing everything” or learned how to dry-clean themselves. To date, no viable alternative to this form of household labor has appeared in the private market. Because it is women who do the increased amounts of unpaid domestic work, households do not consider spending large amounts of money on automatic washers a worthy investment and the private sector does not see providing this service as profitable. Instead, this type of household labor simply becomes further informalized.
Eating out or cooking in?

Soviet Moscow prided itself on inexpensive prepared food provided in diners, schools, factories, and other institutions (Saushkin and Glushkova, 1983), food that was supposed to liberate women from the daily need to cook. In reality, in-home cooking remained a fundamental daily routine even in downtown Moscow, where today half of the city’s restaurants and diners can be found compared to 40% in the recent past (Table 1). Only half of the interviewed families had eaten out in the Soviet past, mainly to celebrate birthdays and other special occasions. Low-quality food, high prices, and long waits to get into cafes and restaurants made it “easier” for families to eat at home. Take-out and “ready-to-cook” meals were rarely available. For women, therefore, cooking at home meant long hours of standing by the stove after hours spent shopping.

After privatization, the restaurant business became one of the fastest growing sectors in the Central District (Table 1). In the study area, the number of restaurants, bars, and fast food diners grew by one-quarter between 1989 and 1995 (Table 2), promising reduced time for cooking and food shopping. Instead of taking advantage of these developments, however, families have dramatically reduced going out even for special occasions: in 1995, three-quarters of the households said they never ate out because they could not afford new restaurants. Some said they would grab a sandwich in a pinch or take children for ice cream. Alexandra is a single parent, a police officer, and an informal trader: “Before, we went out to eat and enjoyed it (laughs). We used to get together with friends, and my mother would always let me go. We used to go out to cafés and restaurants, and there was enough money for everything – for food and for a drink (laughs). No, of course
I don’t [go to restaurants] now. It is too expensive. It is easier to buy the same products at the food market, cook everything at home, and invite people over.”

Even those who do not consider themselves poor do not eat out. For example, Tamara, an art historian and her husband, a forensic doctor with a private income, have done well in recent years, but they never go to cafés or restaurants. In addition to citing the risk of becoming the standby victim of a shooting, Tamara declares: “…Of course, – it is unthinkably expensive. I do not know how much money one has to have to go now to a restaurant.” A look at the prices in private (Russian and foreign) restaurants and cafes in the study area at the time of the interviews explains this situation. For example, the price of lunch ranged from $3-$9 to $25 and for dinner from $11 to $70. To put these prices in context, $70 was about half the average monthly income in 1995, twice the average monthly pension, and the same as the minimum monthly subsistence level (The Jamestown Foundation Prism, vol.II, Oct. 1996, Part 2). 25 Even McDonald’s, the symbol of cheap food in the US, is not cheap in Moscow. 26 Nina, an interpreter, wanted to take her daughter to see what this new exotic place was like, but with her monthly wage of $60 for a part-time job in the state sector, paying $3-$5 for one meal would be a wild luxury. Only one single parent, who was a successful business owner, did not have to cook when she did not feel like it. She did not use city restaurants, though, but ate in a café located in her building, run by and open to its residents, where the food was good and affordable. The other exception was the husband of one interviewed woman, the president of a private airline, who regularly goes to restaurants with his business partners.
To conclude, the expansion in numbers of private restaurants and cafés has not made them more accessible to local residents. Cooking three meals a day remains a necessary task that in most interviewed households was done by women.

**Repair services**

Lack of consumer goods in Soviet society fostered a culture based on reusing and fixing things, a culture that was also supported by a network of repair shops. People repaired shoes, locks, coats, leather and metal accessories, appliances, radios, TV’s, and so on, and these items lasted for years. Repairing and fixing things around the house was an important skill valued especially in men and often their only direct domestic task. In all-women households, repair shops often were the only solution. Privatization radically changed repair services. In the study area, for example, their total number grew by 65% from 1989 to 1995 (see Table 3).

The composition of repair services, however, was transformed as well. First, repair shops for basic consumer items such as clothes, shoes, leather and metal accessories, which had predominated in the past, declined both in absolute numbers and as a share of all repair services – while the prices went up. Second, other consumer-oriented repair services including shops that fix household appliances, A/V equipment, watches, jewelry, and fur have grown rapidly. These shops specialize in foreign-made household technologies and luxury items and refuse to fix simple Soviet-made possessions. Consequently, one-third of the interviewed households have stopped going to repair shops, because husbands have learned how to fix almost everything – from shoes to appliances – by themselves. Those unable to fix things themselves have been forced to buy new imported consumer items.
Because women are more culturally conditioned to use repair services, they are most adversely affected by these changes, as is Alexandra, a police officer, who shares her household with two young sons and her mother: “I now use repair services very rarely, because – well yesterday I went to fix my shoes – but other than that… I have many things to be fixed, an iron, a vacuum cleaner. I went to a repair place but it costs 75 thousand rubles [$14]; it is simpler to buy a new one. I have a warehouse of broken things plus two electrical meat grinders that nobody can fix. It is very difficult because now it is impossible to get anything repaired. They refuse to fix things, and if they do fix them, then in fact it is simpler to buy a new one that will get broken again soon.” Cheap things can be bought at the “goods markets,” but they often break soon and cannot be repaired at all, which, in turn, generates another round of buying in the informal economy instead of using a formal repair shop.

Lack of access to repair shops results in larger amounts of unpaid work at home spent either on repairs or on labor without labor-saving appliances. Instead of remaining a widely used monetized service in the urban market, repairs have been either incorporated into the domestic economy or replaced by consumption in the informal money economy. Finally, the fastest growing repair services involve the maintenance of computers, copy machines, and office equipment – all new services oriented mainly to new private businesses. In general, the restructuring of repair services reflects the rise of the producer- and elite-oriented tertiary sector.

*Hair-styling*

Hair styling is another service that has moved from the formal economy into the informal economies of households. Always under pressure to have fashionable hair, Moscow
women in the past took pains to find a good hair stylist, whom they paid under the table. Men and children usually frequented inexpensive local barber shops. When the 11 hair-salons in the study area were privatized, prices increased dramatically despite the high demand for this service. Hair styling for women became especially costly while the pressure to look stylish remained. Maria, a single mother, earns about $100 (400,000-500,000 rubles) a month working three shifts in an infant orphanage. Going to a local hair salon today would cost her 16% of her monthly income, which prompted her to travel to another town near Moscow where she still paid as much as 4% of her monthly wage for this service.

One-third of the respondents have stopped going to a hairstylist at all because they cannot afford it. In 80% of the interviewed families, household members, friends, or neighbors have become unpaid informal-sector hairdressers, particularly for the children. Women in 23% of households paid a colleague or neighbor and got better quality for lower price. Some women have even decided to grow their hair long in order to eliminate the need to go to a hairdresser on a regular basis.

NEW URBAN GEOGRAPHIES, CLASS, AND GENDER

In one sense, the processes we have described constitute a classic case of higher-return land uses replacing lower-return land uses in the urban fabric, a process familiar to many central cities around the world. Adopting a market economy is turning downtown Moscow into a “normal” capitalist CBD, where land uses compete for space instead of co-existing as they did in the Soviet-era (Gritsai, 1997a). In many American and European cities, downtown living is expensive, and those who cannot afford it move elsewhere or remain trapped in inner-city slums.
As it has in Moscow, urban privatization in Eastern and Central Europe has resulted in
the rapid development of producer services and a reduction in personal consumption
(Enyedi, 1992, p.872). Like their Eastern European counterparts, Moscow residents have
stopped going to films, theaters, museums, parks, and or taking vacations, and they have
reduced even basic consumption in the formal market. By the logic of the market, an
inability to pay indicates a lack of demand and therefore validates the disappearance of
these services and of downtown residents who cannot afford to pay the current prices. In
the Moscow case, are residents moving out in search of more affordable neighborhoods?

The growth of the private tertiary sector in Central District has indeed occurred in tandem
with a population decline there of 12% between January 1992 and January 1998, the
greatest relative decline among Moscow's ten districts. This suggests that privatization
triggered a rapid relocation of the downtown population. However, while certain parts of
the downtown have been rapidly transformed by gentrification and the expansion of
office space (Gdaniec, 1997; O'Loughlin et al., 1997), other neighborhoods, like the study
area, have not experienced as large an outflow of working- and middle-class families.

The key distinction between Western central cities and downtown Moscow is that most
Moscow housing is privatized by sitting tenants (which replicates Soviet-era inequality in
access to housing) and is owner occupied and not rented, which slows down population
turnover. In fact, the main reason for downtown population decline has been extremely
high death rates and low birth rates. Out-migration decreased over the last decade, while
in-migration has been growing after it plummeted steeply but briefly in the early 1990s
Furthermore, since state-supplied free housing ended, many residents of communal apartments have found themselves trapped in their housing units (for details see Pavlovskaya, 1998). Because either buying or renting separate apartments is prohibitively expensive, the only realistic chance these residents have of improving their housing conditions is to be “resettled” by private firms. But private sector interest in converting secondary (i.e., communal) housing to elite apartments or office space has declined since the middle of the decade (Vendina, 1997). Finally, families that live in and now own separate downtown apartments are not likely to relocate voluntarily to the periphery. In addition, renting more spacious units is in general beyond what most Muscovites can afford; people are reluctant to live in rental units because a rental housing culture is virtually absent. Finally, deeply rooted in place, Muscovites have always placed a high cultural value on downtown residence (Vasil’yev and Privalova, 1984). Moving out has always been a difficult trade-off between gaining larger apartments and giving up living in cherished downtown neighborhoods (Gdaniec, 1997). Therefore, besides a relatively small number of wealthy gentrifiers, most of the current population of Central District includes households of varied structures and income levels, many of which are families with children.

In other words, barring radical change in the operation of the housing market, these households will be living in Central District for a long time and will continue to depend on the local urban environment in their daily lives for a whole range of affordable goods and services. They will not have stopped needing food and clothes, doing laundry, fixing broken appliances, or wanting their children to have a rich education or be on a safe playground, although their needs are not recognized as demand by the private market.
This is particularly troubling because all respondents had living wages in the past and did not consider themselves poor but today the private economy has made basic services inaccessible to local residents geographically and/or financially. “I feel very, very sorry that these small very good stores are going away. Maybe they already think that nobody lives in downtown anymore because only the wealthy move in now. Luzhkov [Moscow Mayor] says it right on TV, I heard it myself: Downtown is for the rich, and if it is hard for the retired to live here – go to Ulianovsk [a town in Russia far away from Moscow], it is cheaper there.”

By shifting certain economic functions from the formal urban economy to the informal household economy, the transition has shaped class and gender in the labor market and inside households. Although 90% of Soviet women worked outside the home, in Soviet culture waged and domestic work were mapped to conventional gender identities, which produced a “double burden” of housework plus paid employment for women. With the transition to capitalism, full employment is no longer guaranteed by the state, jobs paying a living wage are scarce, and consumption at the market is very expensive. Following patriarchal gender ideology, virtually everyone, including the state, politicians, academics, writers, and employers have encouraged women and not men to leave the labor market and “return home” (Gruzdeva et al.. 1993; Khotkina and Mezentseva, 1992; Ananiev, 1995). Some women have been ready to give up waged work because they see doing “only” housework as preferable to continuing to bear the double burden. Only one woman in the sample – the mother of seven children who was married to a high-ranking Soviet official – had been a full-time housekeeper in the past. In 1995, in 27% of households one adult had left formal employment to work at home. In only two cases
were these men, and in both they had found themselves unable to earn more income than their wives in the new market economy. In addition, some women have stayed in low-paying but flexible jobs because such jobs allow them to take on domestic tasks more easily.

It is important to emphasize that almost all these households need a cash income, but the costs of market consumption are so high that people opt for free or unpaid production at home. In striking contrast to falling output in the formal economy, the production of goods and services in the private spaces of households is higher than ever. Households make food, sew clothes, fix shoes, cook meals, do laundry, clean, iron, care for and educate their children. As the story of Antonina and Pavel demonstrated, the desire of families to be virtually self-sufficient is ironically at odds with the rapidly growing private tertiary sector.

Domestic work is, however, not only unpaid but also usually less skilled than the paid jobs people had before. For these individuals (who are predominantly women), returning to formal employment will be difficult. As domestic work is further linked to women’s identities, these changes also undermine opportunities available to those women who have to stay employed under any circumstances in order to support their families, including most single parents.30

CONCLUSION

Moscow has actively privatized its economy and housing and made a huge effort to attract foreign investment and create a new market infrastructure, running ahead of the rest of Russia in the transition to both capitalism and post-industrialism. Post-Soviet
Russia has embraced an unconditional faith in the market and its prosperity-building capacity, a faith largely grounded in repudiating the former political and economic system. The transition in Russia continues to deviate from predictions, however, forcing even the World Bank to admit that “market economies are far more complicated than textbook models often describe them” (Lyle, 1999).

This research shows that although the privatization of urban space in Moscow could be considered a success in terms of its breadth and depth, it has failed to improve the quality of life of city residents. Urban change so far has produced mainly negative consequences and created barriers to household survival instead of responding to household needs. Ironically, the consumer-oriented service sector neglected by Soviet-style development is no less neglected by the private economy. Although 8.5 million Muscovites (Moskovsky… 1998) are in need of basic goods and services, the expanding tertiary sector has chosen to not compete for their consumption; it simply does not consider them worth serving. Exceptions are businesses that cater to the small but conspicuously consuming elite or businesses that support the private sector itself (e.g., repairs of imported household technologies and producer services).

Moscow’s engagement with “creatively destructive” market capitalism creates a paradox. The void produced by the destruction of the Soviet urban fabric and allocation mechanisms is filled not by a new formal private sector but by an informal cash sector and by non-market domestic labor. Equipped with high-level business and information services, Moscow’s private capital advances into the post-industrial era. At the same time, most Moscow households are transitioning to an “anti-post-industrial” or even to a pre-industrial way of living, where more basic goods and services are produced inside the
home than are bought at the market. The exploding private sector and ordinary households function in different economic spaces, which overlap geographically in downtown Moscow but hardly intersect. The space of the self-serving private sector is where capital has been creative, while its destructive forces have been deployed in the spaces of people’s everyday lives. There are only so many buildings in the historic downtown. Once converted to new uses in the interests of the elite and big business and transferred to the informal cash and domestic household economies, these “low-return” services might be unable to reenter the urban fabric; it will be hard to “rewrite” the urban landscape taking into account the daily lives of ordinary households.

As in-home labor replaces market consumption, the economy becomes more “demonetized” and evolves into a “non-monetary market economy” (Clarke, 1998), another postmodern oxymoron of Russia’s capitalism. Important class and gender transformations follow inside the household and in the larger economy. Given the largely patriarchal mindset of post-Soviet society, such changes work to the disadvantage of women, particularly women with dependent children.
NOTES

1 We would like to thank Moskovskoye Aerogeodezicheskoye Predpriatiye and Evroadres for donating their datasets and digital maps for the study area; the residents of the study area who generously agreed to participate in this research project; and Kevin St.Martin for comments on the drafts of the article. Marianna Pavlovskaya also would like to thank the IDRISI Project for making her stay in Moscow possible.

2 Macro-economic and structural adjustment policies are designed by Western consultants to create the conditions for capitalism to “take off.” They include privatization of state assets, liberalization of prices, stabilization of money supply, and openness to foreign competition.

3 In the entire city of Moscow, only one apartment exchange bureau facilitated the exchange of apartments between families. In addition, many apartments exchanges were arranged informally, by households members or informal brokers. These transactions often involved informal payments to such brokers as well as under-the-table compensation to those whose apartment space decreased in size in the process of the exchange or to those who lost a locational advantage. However, the existence of propiska (see note 5) precluded the development of a housing market and resulted in low residential mobility within the city.
4 All Soviet people were tenants but the law provided for many opportunities to keep housing within a family, which, according to (Vite, not dated) was in a way a de facto privatization of housing.

5 Propiska is a legal right to reside in a housing unit at a particular street address. In the internal passports of all (legal) Moscow residents, for example, the address where they have propiska is recorded.

6 Thus, between 1960 and 1988 the total supply of housing in the central city dropped by 50% (Bater 1994).

7 While existing state enterprises were privatized at a high rate, the share that were privatized between 1992-1997 constituted only 7% (or 15,453 out of 216,171) in the total number of enterprises in 1997 (calculated from Moskovsky… 1998, p.182, and Administrativnye…in 1998, p.28).

8 The data at the scale of these smaller municipal districts (total of 128) are inconsistent or unavailable. Most indicators are published for the 10 large districts. Before 1992 Moscow comprised 33 districts for which some data was available (most indicators described only the whole city). The problem is that the new territorial units are not aggregates or even parts of the old 33 districts, which makes it impossible to compare intra-urban data for the periods before and after 1992. A result of Post-Soviet power struggles in Moscow, this “geopolitical engineering” not only uprooted the old power structures (O’Loughlin et al., 1997; Bater et al., 1998) but also eliminated connections
between the past and the present, between “socialism” and “capitalism.” This creates a serious methodological problem for researchers that can be only partially overcome by using GIS techniques.

9 Percentages of businesses in each sector are very close to the employment structure by sector. Data on numbers of enterprises by sector for each administrative district is published for longer than the data on employment. Consequent analysis of the field data also involves numbers of businesses and their location in the study area.

10 The next two districts – South and the West account for only 12% each.

11 In reality, the transformation is even deeper because these numbers (as all published data) do not account for uses that entirely disappeared and/or were transformed into new ones.

12 In the past, each phone book was perfectly useable for many years, but today each becomes obsolete almost immediately. These data, however, indicate well the direction and nature of the urban restructuring. This information was verified by ground truthing and complemented by data provided by the BTU administration.

13 The sampling frame included families of children attending three local schools who also live in the study area.

14 The dramatic fall in birth rates in Russia also indicates that most families see children as the responsibility they cannot afford.
The average size of sample households is higher (3.5) because all families have children and one-third are extended households.

Families with three or more children are entitled to financial assistance both from the government and at the workplace. However, assistance has always been minimal.

In Soviet cities, self-serve laundromats were rare. Instead, people brought their laundry to nearby drop off centers and picked up washed, ironed, and starched clothes and bedsheets 3-4 days later. Everything was washed in large industrial laundries, and the quality was poor. However, given that most families did not have automatic washing machines in their homes and most laundry had to be done by hand, the appearance of laundromats or a revised network of drop off places seemed to be one logical possible outcome of privatization.

School busing does not exist in Moscow; children walk or use public transportation to get to school.

For example, to buy a pound of cheese, first, you had to wait in line to ask the clerk to pack the needed quantity and find out the price. Then you had to wait in line to pay the cashier, go back to the first counter with the receipt and wait in line with people with receipts to pick up your cheese.

In Moscow, most stores close early and only a few kiosks are open 24 hours a day.
According to Mosgorstat, in 1990 Moscow’s households spent 32% of their income on food and 39% on other consumer items, while in 1995 food consumed 51% of their income and other goods 17%. By 1997 these figures were 54% and 17% respectively (Moskovsky… in 1998).

Shuttle-traders (“chelnoki” in Russian) are people of various social background whose income today comes from the informal “international trade.” They make trips to countries of Eastern Europe and Asia to buy cheap consumer goods, bring them back to Russia as personal belongings and then sell them through networks or at the goods markets.

In addition to regular stores, a network of temporary retail outlets or “kiosks” now blocks sidewalks and entrances to subway stations. These “mini convenience stores” sell things from candies and sunglasses to dry food and fruit, cigarettes and liquors. Their impact on the urban landscape, connections to the black market, and the quality of goods sold create controversy, but many women find them useful because they are open late. These kiosks are a temporary and low-cost solution to lack of commercial space in the Soviet cities, which has proven be quite permanent. For discussion of kiosks in St.Petersburg see (Axenov et al., 1997).

It is a cultural imperative in Moscow households to iron all clothes, towels, bed sheets, underwear, handkerchiefs, and so on, which, obviously, translates into many hours of additional work.
At the exchange rate at that time of about 5,500 rubles for $1. These numbers, however, downplay the fall in real income, because in 1995 the annual inflation rate was as high as 131% (OMRI... No 4, 7 Jan. 1997). In 1996 alone consumer prices rose by 16.1% with food prices up 13.1%, prices for non-food goods up 13.2%, and the price of consumer services up 35.7% (OMRI... 172, 5 September, 1996).

McDonald’s prices in Moscow are ruble equivalents of the US dollar prices but the average monthly wage in the first half of 1996 was only about $150 or 714,000 rubles (Jamestown Foundation Prism, vol.II, October, 1996, Part 2).

One could easily fix a leather bag with a ripped handle or broken zippers in winter boots. Shortages produced a low consumption society with a conservation behavior ethic unusual for an industrialized country.

The true land market does not exist in Moscow because land belongs to the city and can only be leased for long periods of time. Only buildings themselves and apartments can be bought and sold. Nevertheless, property prices and rents already rival those in the largest cities of the West.

The next largest decline of 6% occurred in the North district. Altogether, 6 districts lost population during this period, while 4 others gained new residents.

Women bring in 40% of total household income in Russia (Gruzdeva et al., 1993).
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Vite, O. T., not dated, *Epokha zastoia zhdet reabilitatsii [The stagnation period awaits its reabilitation]*. Article posted on the internet.
TABLE 1. ECONOMIC CHANGE BY SECTOR IN CENTRAL DISTRICT, 1993-1997.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic sector</th>
<th>Share in number of establishments in 1997, % (Total = 59,034)</th>
<th>Share of district in Moscow total by sector</th>
<th>Percent change in district by sector in 1993-1997, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing, Construction, Transportation and Communication</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail and Wholesale</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dining</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>+11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer services</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and social services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>+15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary activities</td>
<td>Type of building use</td>
<td>1989 N</td>
<td>1995 N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer services</td>
<td>Daycare center</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health clinic</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barbershop/Hair salon</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Repairs center</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Laundry service</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dry-cleaning</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hotel</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restaurant, cafe, diner</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tourist firm</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**TABLE 2. RESTRUCTURING OF THE TERTIARY SECTOR IN THE STUDY AREA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of repair service</th>
<th>1989 N</th>
<th>1995 N</th>
<th>1989 %</th>
<th>1995 %</th>
<th>% change</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clothing, hats, linens</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-25</td>
<td>Consumer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather, metal accessories</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-33</td>
<td>Consumer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-33</td>
<td>Consumer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appliances and sawing machines</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>+100</td>
<td>Consumer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio, video, radio, TV, phones</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>+250</td>
<td>Consumer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, window treatments</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>+400</td>
<td>Consumer/Producer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office, copying, computer equipment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>+550</td>
<td>Producer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GIS database (field data)

TABLE 3. CHANGE IN REPAIR SERVICES IN THE STUDY AREA BETWEEN 1989 AND 1995
### Commercial, Industrial Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>+800</th>
<th>Producer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Watches, jewelry, furs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>+300</td>
<td>Consumer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>+300</td>
<td>Consumer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total repair services</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>+64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GIS field data.
FIGURE 1. STUDY AREA IN THE CITY OF MOSCOW.